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I. INTRODUCTION
In an article for The New Yorker titled Active Shooter, David Sedaris
quipped that, in preparing for the potential that a psychopath might break
into his home, he would just as soon have a back door as a gun.1 Sedaris
wrote the article after visiting a shooting range in North Carolina.2 Before,
during, and after the writing of the article, Sedaris lived in the United
Kingdom and noted that in the United Kingdom, it is nearly impossible to
acquire a handgun let alone fire a handgun for sport.3

1.
2.
3.
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Conversely, in the United States, a citizen has a right to a handgun.4
Proponents of the right defend it atavistically, leaning on tradition and history5
and asserting—if not explicitly, then implicitly—that the right to bear
arms defines their identity as Americans.6 Those opposed to the right to
own an arm, a handgun, point to the United States’ problems with gun
violence.7

4 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). In general, states place more
procedural restrictions on acquiring a handgun than they do on acquiring a long gun. See
Gun Laws by State: The Complete Guide, GUNS TO CARRY (2018), https://www.gunsto
carry.com/gun-laws-state/#states [https://perma.cc/BP5J-8Z4K]. States also restrict handgun
purchases by age, varying from eighteen, in gun-friendly states such as Alabama, to twentyone, in gun-restrictive states such as California. Brianna Stone, Here Are the Gun Laws
for All 50 States in the U.S., DAILY DOT (Apr. 5, 2018, 4:02 PM), https://www.daily
dot.com/layer8/gun-laws-by-state [https://perma.cc/6T9K-9BRV].
5. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 627; Sam Zuidema, Note, Raising Heller: Constitutional
Scrutiny in a New Age of Second Amendment Rights, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 840.
6. See Larry Donnelly, America’s Gun Culture: What Makes Americans So Attached
to Their Weapons?, JOURNAL.IE (Mar. 4, 2018, 9:45 AM), https://www.thejournal.ie/readme/
americas-gun-culture-3877087-Mar2018 [https://perma.cc/GFX9-BLGG]. Larry Donnelly,
a lecturer at NUI Galway, an Irish University, answers the question he poses in the title of
his article by pointing to gun-owning Americans’ “rugged individualism.” Id. He
describes this as the desire both to assert an ability to survive on the frontier and to stand
up against an oppressive government. Id. Donnelly posits that gun ownership represents
this “rugged individualism.” Id. He argues that, to the gun owner, gun ownership is a sort of
individual triumph over the government, an expression of the fighting spirit that makes
one American. Id.
The website on which Donnelly wrote his article has a comments section. Two comments
support Donnelly’s contention that “rugged individualism” defines gun ownership. In the first
comment, a reader muses that taking away guns is like “asking us to give up beer and
whiskey.” Donnelly, supra. In the second, the reader explains that to live without a gun
in the wilds of Wyoming would be “insane.” Id. Each comment demonstrates one of
Donnelly’s points. The first illustrates both a sort of dislike or distrust of a potentially oppressive
government and the notion that guns occupy a place in American culture akin to other
equally American items like beer and whiskey. The second demonstrates the necessity of
guns in certain rural areas of America.
Both of these comments also demonstrate a conception of arm ownership that this
Comment will explore: arms as a good versus arms as a right. The first unintentionally
compares gun ownership to owning alcoholic goods. The second explains the importance of
the utility of guns and not so much the value of claiming a right to a gun. In both, there is an
implied conflict between guns protected by the Second Amendment and guns to which
one has the nonconstitutional right to own and use.
7. See generally America’s Gun Culture in 10 Charts, BBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41488081 [https://perma.cc/JK22-RLMC].
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Consequently, the debate over gun control and gun ownership has
created a political chasm.8 This Comment aims to set aside politics and
engage in legal analysis. At times it may seem that this Comment leans to the
left of the aforementioned chasm, but it does so on the backing not of statistics
and rhetoric but on legal fact and interpretation. Hopefully, this Comment
can narrow, and not amplify, the chasm.
Before continuing, it will be helpful to briefly describe three premises
under which this Comment analyzes the Second Amendment. The first is the
simplest. This Comment distinguishes between the individual right to bear
arms and the right to bear arms to form a militia.9 Of course, the latter implies
that the individual will need to bear at least some kind of arm.10 However,
the individual right to bear arms is distinct because it is the right to bear arms
absent any relationship to forming a militia. Therefore, the individual has
a right to bear arms for the purpose of forming a militia and the right to bear
arms for individual purposes.11 This Comment focuses on the latter and will
refer to it as the individual right.
The second premise is that there are two distinct groups of arms: arms
to which one now has a constitutional right and arms to which one has had
—and continues to have—a nonconstitutional right.12 The importance of
this premise is the result of widespread arm ownership with varied use prior

8. See Matt Laslo, Get Ready for a Massive Fight over Gun Control in Congress
in 2019, VICE NEWS (Dec. 31, 2018), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/kzvjyz/getready-for-a-massive-fight-over-gun-control-in-congress-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/L6FCSMZH]. The article explains that a recent bill demanding a limited reform to background check
measures did not receive enough votes to even be debated. Id. The bill died by filibuster.
See id. The article notes, however, that some Democrats have recently won in GOP strongholds
when running on strict gun-control platforms. See id. Yet, these Democrats recognize that
rapid change is not plausible. See id.
9. Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (codifying the individual right to bear arms),
with United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (affirming that the Second Amendment
protects the right to form a militia).
10. See infra Section I.B. See generally George A. Moscary, Note, Explaining Away
the Obvious: The Infeasibility of Characterizing the Second Amendment as a Nonindividual
Right, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2174 (2008) (“The individual right model is a better
interpretation of the Second Amendment than the collective right model because it accounts for
and reconciles both halves of the Amendment.”).
11. See infra Sections I.B.1, I.B.2.
12. For a discussion of the tension between the Bill of Rights with other legal rights,
see generally Laurence Claus, Protecting Rights from Rights: Enumeration, Disparagement, and the
Ninth Amendment, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 585 (2004) (“Did adopting the Bill of
Rights affect other legal rights that Americans possessed at the Founding and possess
today?”). This distinction is not made to subordinate one kind of a right to the other, but
it is uncontroversial that constitutional rights trounce nonconstitutional rights. See
Michael Coenen, Constitutional Privileging, 99 V A . L. R EV . 683, 684 (2013). The
constitutional law restricts the nonconstitutional law, and it is the constitutional law that
prevails in a conflict between the two. See id.

1132

GAARDER-FEINGOLD_56-4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 56: 1129, 2019]

12/13/2019 11:08 AM

Another Shot at Rectifying Heller Ambiguities
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

to the codification of the individual right. For example, before the
codification of the individual right, one had the nonconstitutional right to
hunt using a hunting rifle.13 Now, one still has the nonconstitutional right
to own and use a hunting rifle but not necessarily the right to own and use
a hunting rifle under the Second Amendment individual right.14 Conversely,
a court ruling restricting the individual right does not imply that the arms
at issue lose all legal protections—only the protection of a constitutional
right.15
The third premise follows from the second. The third premise distinguishes
the right to bear arms from other constitutional rights on the basis that
arms are—potentially dangerous16—goods and thus, present unique regulatory
issues. Therefore, in the context of Second Amendment adjudication, arms
can be subject to a Commerce Clause analysis.17 This analysis will further
distinguish the two categories of arms described in the second premise.
Of course, any arms regulation—dealing with the constitutional right or
not—may violate the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, or any
other constitutional protection. However, this Comment will not consider
those potentialities because a due process or equal protection claim is not
inherently related to a Second Amendment claim.18 To the contrary, the
13. See Joseph Blocher, Hunting and the Second Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 133, 176 (2015). This Article explains that hunting will receive protection, not from
the Second Amendment, but from the political process. Id. Further, Blocher’s analysis
reveals a key distinction that this Comment hopes to reinforce: gun ownership can be, and
in fact is most often, distinct from the Second Amendment individual right to bear arms.
See id.
14. See Caba v. Weaknecht, 64 A.3d 39, 59 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (asserting that
the right to carry a weapon for self-defense is “worthy of more protection than an interest
in engaging in the sport of hunting”); David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure,
History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 597 (2000) (arguing that
hunting is not an interest supported by the history of the Second Amendment). But see
United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011) (Niemeyer, J., concurring)
(concluding that the Second Amendment protects the right to bear arms not only in selfdefense but also in forming a militia and for hunting).
15. See infra Part VI.
16. See German Lopez, Study: Where Gun Laws Are Weaker, There Are More Mass
Shootings, VOX (Mar. 8, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/3/8/18254626/massshootings-gun-violence-laws-study [https://perma.cc/J6TS-LXW8].
17. See infra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2.
18. Compare the court’s handling of an equal protection claim in the context of arm
ownership in United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2013), with the
court’s handling of the Commerce Clause in United States v. Henry, 688 F.3d 637, 640–
42 (9th Cir. 2012). In Chovan, the equal protection claim had little to do with either the arms
at issue or the Second Amendment. 735 F.3d at 1132–33. The analysis centered on an unfair
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Commerce Clause could apply to all Second Amendment claims because
arms are goods that are potentially either in or affecting interstate or intrastate
commerce. 19 The relationship to the Commerce Clause is of special
importance because arms—as goods—generally fall under the Commerce
Clause’s purview.20 This analysis is doctrinally separate but practically,
inextricably related to the Second Amendment.21
Overall, these three premises will guide this Comment’s analysis. The
following hopes to present a reconceptualization of the Second Amendment
—at least to some degree.
A. The Inception of the Second Amendment
The protections of the Second Amendment were neither original nor
unique. Many state constitutions included a bill of rights provision guaranteeing
a militia.22 The states added these provisions, in part, to protect the citizens
from a potentially oppressive state government.23 In turn, the Second
difference of treatment between ex-felons and ex-misdemeanants with regard to firearm
possession. See id. In essence, had the law treated both groups the same, the plaintiff
would not have invoked the equal protection claim. The plaintiff still would have invoked
a Second Amendment right to bear arms. See id. at 1133. In Henry, the Commerce Clause
authorized a ban on machine gun possession. 688 F.3d at 641. The court analyzed the
Second Amendment claim and the Commerce Clause claim separately. Id. at 639–42. It
would seem that here, too, the Commerce Clause analysis had little to do with the Second
Amendment analysis, and it does from a doctrinal perspective. However, any Second
Amendment claim could involve a claim that an arm—a good—is being regulated in an
unconstitutional manner. A Commerce Clause claim would argue that a good is being regulated
in an unconstitutional manner. See infra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2. In this way, the Commerce
Clause is practically linked to almost any Second Amendment claim. In other words, the
regulation at issue in Henry cannot invoke the Second Amendment without invoking the
Commerce Clause. It cannot because the regulation deals with goods and, as such, inherently
invokes the Commerce Clause. The regulation at issue in Chovan can be modified, as indicated,
to remove an equal protection claim while maintaining a Second Amendment claim. It can
because the Equal Protection Clause has no inherent connection to the Second Amendment.
19. See infra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2.
20. See supra discussion accompanying note 18.
21. See supra discussion accompanying note 18.
22. DAVID E. YOUNG, THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN COMMENTARIES ON LIBERTY, FREE GOVERNMENT AND
AN ARMED POPULACE 1787–1792, at xxvi (David E. Young ed., 2d ed. 1995).
23. See id. Pennsylvania’s early constitution provided that the people have the right
to bear arms “for the defence of themselves and the state.” PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII.
Similarly, Massachusetts’s early constitution provided that the people have the “right to
keep and bear arms for the common defence.” MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XVII. Pennsylvania’s
constitution implies that the people have the right to both bear arms to defend the state
against some foreign force and defend themselves against the state. Massachusetts’s constitution
was not as explicit as Pennsylvania’s, but it did imply a similar duality. The people could
bear arms in common defense; the common defense would be the people against the state
or the state, as the common, against a foreign force.
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Amendment grew out of the antifederalists’ desire that the new Constitution
provide a similar protection against the federal government.24 John DeWitt,
the penname of an ardent, if not extreme, antifederalist,25 believed that
Congress assumed the power to “raise and support [a]rmies”26 so that it could
destroy the states’ strength and the states’ “respective Governments.”27
To ensure that this did not happen, the people needed the assurance that
they could form their own fighting force, a militia.28 The framers understood
militia to mean every able-bodied citizen in each state.29 Able-bodied citizens
consisted only of property-owning males.30 In order for a group of citizens
to be properly considered a militia, those citizens needed training in the “use
of arms for the purposes of war.”31 Therefore, the Second Amendment,
at inception and at face value, seems to protect the war-trained, propertyowning male’s ability to form a militia with other war-trained, propertyowning males. Facially, this does not imply that the individual had the right
to bear arms for the sake of the individual.32 Although many citizens might
have owned arms at the founding, these citizens did not have a constitutional

24. YOUNG, supra note 22, at xxvi.
25. Paul Finkelman, “A Well Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in Historical
Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 233 (2000).
26. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12.
27. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 131.
28. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008) (“It was understood
across the political spectrum that the right helped to secure the ideal of a citizen militia,
which might be necessary to oppose an oppressive military force if the constitutional order
broke down.”).
29. EARL R. KRUSCHKE, GUN CONTROL: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 382 (1995).
30. 2 JAMES BURGH, Of the Army, in POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS: OR, AN ENQUIRY
INTO PUBLIC ERRORS, DEFECTS, AND ABUSES, bk. III, ch. III, at 389, 402 (London, E. & C.
Dilly 1774).
31. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 153 (Law Exch. Ltd., 2d ed. 2014) (1829).
32. See id. It implies that the individual has the right to bear arms for proper
military use. A completely disarmed citizenry would violate that right. See United States
v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 235 (5th Cir. 2001). However, because the individual has a
right to bear arms to fulfill the right to form a well-regulated militia does not in turn imply
that the individual has the right to use that arm for individual purposes. The Emerson court
makes the opposite claim in support of an individual right. Id. at 259–60. This logic fails
under a historical analysis because the arm-bearing populace at the founding exceeded the
arm-bearing citizens that could form, and thus have a right to form, a militia. See supra
notes 29–31 and accompanying text. Therefore, the individual right does not relate to
the right to form a militia because, at the founding, bearing arms needed no constitutional
protection except to ensure that the citizenry—with limitations, of course—could use those
arms in furtherance of an organized militia.
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right to those arms in the same way that war-trained, property-owning males
had a constitutional right to bear arms in furtherance of a militia.33
Regardless of the initial impetus of the Second Amendment, it now
protects an individual’s right to bear arms.34 Although this Comment will
not dispute this point, it is worthwhile to consider where, how, and why
the Second Amendment originated when trying to grapple with the complexities
it currently presents.
B. The Two Defining Cases of the Second Amendment’s
Relatively Quiet Life
The Second Amendment protects not only the citizen’s right to bear
arms for the purpose of forming a “well regulated militia”35 but also the
citizen’s right to bear arms in defense of “hearth and home” absent the purpose
of forming a militia.36 The 1939 case United States v. Miller affirmed the
former.37 Nearly seventy years later, the 2008 case District of Columbia
v. Heller affirmed the latter.38
1. United States v. Miller
In Miller, the Supreme Court concluded that any interpretation or
application of the Second Amendment must keep the preservation of the

33. See RAWLE, supra note 31, at 135. This distinction does not suppose that the
Founders would dismiss the ability of other individuals to resist an oppressive government.
It demonstrates that the right to bear arms to achieve that purpose is limited to war-trained,
property-owning males who have come together to form a militia. Any other citizen could
resist an oppressive government, but the Second Amendment does not, on its face, protect
that citizen’s right to achieve that resistance by bearing arms.
34. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
35. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). Note that this is not the
collective rights theory. See William Don Edwards & Phillip B. Rose, A Matter of Standing: A
Recap of Second Amendment Developments, 35 LINCOLN L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2007–2008). The
collective rights theory limits the Second Amendment to the right of the states—not the
citizens as a whole—to form a well-regulated militia. Id. This right does not protect the
individual’s possession of a weapon. Id. at 3. It protects only the state’s right to form a
well-regulated militia that could oppose a potentially tyrannical federal government. Id.
at 2–3. Consequently, under the collective rights theory, an individual would not have
standing to bring a Second Amendment claim. Id. at 3. Furthermore, courts adhering to
the collective rights theory would uphold nearly any regulation enacted by a state unless such
a regulation also violated the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. Id. at 3.
36. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
37. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178–79. For a brief description of courts’ reactions to Miller,
see Robert J. Cottrol & George A. Mocsary, Guns, Bird Feathers, and Overcriminalization:
Why Courts Should Take the Second Amendment Seriously, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17,
28–29 (2016).
38. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635–36.
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states’ militias as its end goal.39 With that goal in mind, the Court determined
that certain provisions of the National Firearms Act (NFA), which restricted
selling and transferring sawed-off shotguns, did not violate the Second
Amendment.40 The Court reasoned that owning or using “such an instrument”
bears no “reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia.”41 Interestingly, the Court engaged in a sort of balancing
test wherein it balanced the NFA’s restrictions against its infringement
upon a citizen’s ability to form a well-regulated militia; Justice Scalia would
later disavow such a balancing test in his Heller opinion.42
The Miller holding does not rest on air. A linguistic analysis of the
Second Amendment and a historical analysis of the political climate at the
Second Amendment’s inception confirm the holding.43 A plain reading
39. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
40. Id.
41. Id. Not every commentator agrees that Miller implies that the Second Amendment
right does not extend to non-militia, individual activities. Some commentators believe that
the Court did not focus on the scope of the right but on the scope of the weapons used to
act on that right. See T. Markus Funk, Gun Control and Economic Discrimination: The
Melting-Point Case-in-Point, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 764, 782 (1995) (“[N]othing
in the holding on the merits focuses on whether the accused were within the Amendment;
the holding instead focuses on whether the weapon was within the Amendment. . . . [T]he
holding in Miller does . . . support the proposition that the Second Amendment protects an
individual’s right to . . . bear arms.”); Stephen P. Halbrook, Second-Class Citizenship and the
Second Amendment in the District of Columbia, 5 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 105, 165 (1995)
(arguing that the Miller Court did not question the “private, individual character” of the
Second Amendment right and did not “suggest that the possessor must be a member of the
militia”). But see United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992) (asserting
that Miller dealt with the right to possess a double-barreled, sawed-off shotgun). Funk and
Halbrook’s analyses assume that if the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right
to bear arms for the purpose of forming a militia, the individual, thus, has a right to keep
and bear arms. In part, each argues that if one has a right to form a militia, one has a right
to the items necessary to form a militia. But each does not stop there; each asserts that the
right to items necessary to form a militia confers the right to bear those arms on the individual.
This is problematic when considering the nature of the individual right created in Heller.
554 U.S. at 595. Consider Congress’s ability to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art.
1, § 8, cl. 3. That ability implies that Congress can use the necessary means to regulate interstate
commerce. It does not imply that Congress has the ability use those means absent a connection
to interstate commerce. Similarly, an individual can have the right to form a militia. An
individual can have the right to the means necessary—arms—to forming that militia. But this
does not imply that, absent the purpose of forming a militia, the individual has a right to bear
arms.
42. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.
43. See generally Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Unfaithful to Textualism, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 385 (2012) (explaining that a linguistic approach to reading the Second Amendment does
not allow for an individual right); Finkelman, supra note 25 (explaining that the Second
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of the Second Amendment supports the Court’s insistence on the importance
of the relationship between the regulations imposed by the NFA and the
ability to preserve a well-regulated militia.44 Jeffrey P. Kaplan, a professor
of linguistics, argues that a purely textualist reading of the Second Amendment
supports only the right to bear arms insofar that a “state depends for its
security on a well-regulated militia.”45 The Miller Court asserts that such
a relationship exists between the citizenry and its ability to form a wellregulated militia rather than between the state and its ability to do so.46
Further, the tension between the federalists and antifederalists47 in 1789
supports the conclusion that the Second Amendment’s purpose and intent
protects the citizens from the power, or potential power, of the federal
government by allowing those citizens to maintain armed militias.48
2. District of Columbia v. Heller
Neither the tension between the federalists and antifederalists nor the
plain language of the Second Amendment directly endorses the individual
right advanced by Heller.49 However, this Comment will not attempt to
rectify the Heller right with the plain, historical, or contemporary meaning

Amendment’s protection of a well-regulated militia was the result of debates between the
federalists and antifederalists during the founding).
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. II; Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
45. Kaplan, supra note 43, at 427–28. This assertion is in line with the collective rights
theory. See Edwards & Rose, supra note 35, at 2–3 (providing a discussion on the collective
rights theory as it pertains to the Second Amendment). Although that theory is suspect, the
force of Kaplan’s statement does not change when the relationship invokes the citizens’ right
as a whole and not the states’ rights individually.
46. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178–79.
47. See supra Section I.B. The antifederalists worried that the new Constitution
would threaten the sovereignty that the states enjoyed under the Articles of Confederation.
See Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest for
Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 241 (2004). In a speech, Patrick Henry questioned
the language of the Constitution’s preamble: “We, the people.” PATRICK HENRY, SPEECHES OF
PATRICK HENRY IN THE VIRGINIA RATIFYING CONVENTION (June 1788), reprinted in 5 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 211 (Herbert J. Storing, ed. 1981). Henry believed the Constitution’s
preamble should have read, “We, the States,” because states are “the soul of the confederation.”
Id. The federalists, on the other hand, supported a strong national government, albeit to
different degrees. See Smith, supra, at 234–35 (“Some of the Federalists . . . wanted to abolish
the states, while others believed that the proposed Constitution’s national government was too
strong and should be limited in authority by subsequent amendment.” (footnotes omitted)).
48. See Finkelman, supra note 25, at 233.
49. Id.; see Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early
American Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 499–500 (2004) (“Even if
one includes the Revolutionary Era and the federalist era, references to anything that might
be construed as a constitutional right of individual self-defense are exceedingly rare, and
almost always turn out to be statements from dissenting constitutional texts that expressed
the point of view of the losers . . . .”).

1138

GAARDER-FEINGOLD_56-4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 56: 1129, 2019]

12/13/2019 11:08 AM

Another Shot at Rectifying Heller Ambiguities
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

of the Second Amendment. This Comment will accept the individual right
to bear arms as law no matter how questionable and controversial it may
be.
The issue in Heller was whether or not a handgun ban in the District of
Columbia could pass constitutional muster.50 In deciding that such a ban
was unconstitutional, Justice Scalia reasoned that the Second Amendment
confers an individual right to bear arms.51 In his opinion, Justice Scalia
explained that the Court will continue to modify and explore the extent of
this individual right but that, at the very least, the Second Amendment
protects the right of the law-abiding citizen to use a firearm in defense of
the home.52 Along with failing to consider the scope of the right he defined,
Justice Scalia admits that he, and his majority, did not set a level of scrutiny
to use when an issue of the individual right to bear arms comes before a
court.53 Justice Scalia did note that rational basis scrutiny would not suffice.54
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer noted the majority’s failure to
specify a proper level of scrutiny, so he proposed an interest-balancing
test.55 Justice Breyer believed that the court should ask whether “the statute
burdens a protected interest . . . out of proportion to the statute’s salutary
effects upon other important governmental interests.”56 Justice Scalia explicitly
rejected Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach because no other
constitutional right is subject to “a freestanding” interest-balancing test.57

50. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008). This would not be
the last time that the District of Columbia tried to regulate handgun ownership. See Daniel
Trotta, U.S. Appeals Court Blocks D.C. Law Restricting Gun Rights, REUTERS (July 25,
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-guns-washingtondc-idUSKBN1AA27U
[https://perma.cc/W9WF-PWNZ].
51. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
52. Id. at 635; see cases discussed infra Part IV; see also People v. Cisneros, 356
P.3d 877, 886 (Colo. App. 2014) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635).
53. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.
54. Id. at 628 n.27.
55. Id. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer’s test asserts that the other
governmental interests must be important. Id. The phrase “important governmental interest”
evokes intermediate scrutiny. See infra Section I.B.2.a. Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing
test asks a court to determine if the other governmental interest is important and, if it is, whether
the benefit afforded to the important interest outweighs the burden imposed on the Second
Amendment individual right. Heller, 554 U.S. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
56. Heller, 554 U.S. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 634 (majority opinion); see also Benjamin A. Ellis, Note, “Time Enough” for
Scrutiny: The Second Amendment, Mental Health, and the Case for Intermediate Scrutiny,
25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1325, 1349 (2017) (“Strict scrutiny involves interest balancing as
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However, it seems that Miller applied an interest-balancing test to the
Second Amendment, without issue, seventy years earlier.58 Perhaps Justice
Scalia’s concern lay not in the test itself but in the possible results of such
a test: Justice Scalia believed that application of the interest-balancing test
would deem the District of Columbia handgun ban constitutional.59 In the
end, Justice Scalia did not indicate under which level of scrutiny the handgun
ban would or would not be constitutional; courts have still yet to settle on
the proper test.60 Heller created an individual right to bear arms but failed
to define the scope of that right or indicate which level of scrutiny to apply
when that right comes before a court.61
a. Constitutional Levels of Scrutiny Described but not Defined
A brief foray into the levels of scrutiny and their relationship to the Second
Amendment is necessary before continuing.
Levels of scrutiny crop up in a range of constitutional subjects: free
speech, substantive due process, free exercise of religion, among others—
including the Second Amendment.62 There are three traditional levels of
scrutiny: rational basis, intermediate, and strict scrutiny.63
Although constitutional levels of scrutiny are often applied and studied
legal concepts, there remain pertinent ambiguities surrounding each with
regards to the Second Amendment. These ambiguities make it difficult to
well. That is, the basic ‘logic’ of intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny analysis is very
similar.”).
58. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
59. Ellis, supra note 57, at 1334. Presumably, Justice Scalia came to this result
because even he could admit that the government’s interest in ensuring the safety of its citizens
outweighs the right to own a specific kind of gun in a specific place. Note, however, that
this would not be the case under this Comment’s three-prong test. The solution acknowledges
a limited individual right; the limited right includes the arms protected by Heller—handguns
and other arms necessary to protect the home. Thus, once a court has determined that the
regulation infringes upon that right, it would not engage in interest-balancing. See infra
Part VI for a full discussion of the solution.
60. See generally Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical
Analysis of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433 (2018)
(canvassing the Second Amendment tests applied across circuit and federal courts and the
relative success of such claims under each test).
61. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35.
62. See R. George Wright, What if All Levels of Constitutional Scrutiny Were
Completely Abandoned?, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 165, 165–66 (2014). For discussions of the
levels of scrutiny in other constitutional contexts, see James Weinstein, Free Speech, Abortion
Access, and the Problem of Judicial Viewpoint Discrimination, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
471, 509–15 (1996); Eric A. Roberts, Note, Heightened Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection
Clause: A Remedy to Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 485,
495–96 (1993); Whitney Travis, Note, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Smith:
Dueling Levels of Constitutional Scrutiny, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1701, 1705–11 (2007).
63. Wright, supra note 62, at 169.
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define what exactly each level entails and what differentiates one from
another; the levels of scrutiny are ambiguous themselves. This lack of
clarity mars these supposedly algorithmic rules.64
1. Rational Basis Review
Rational basis review requires a “rational relationship”65 between the
regulation and “some legitimate governmental purpose.”66
Heller excluded the possibility of subjecting Second Amendment
claims to a rational basis review because to do so would deem the Second
Amendment redundant;67 the Constitution already protects against irrational
laws.68 In United States v. Skoien, the court affirmed Heller’s reasoning
for rejecting a rational basis test by explaining that a “rational basis is
essential for legislation in general,” which would, again, render the Second
Amendment pointless.69
The interpretation of rational basis review by these courts falls short
because it fails to consider the role rational basis review could play when
a regulation implicates the fringes of the right. For example, a regulation
could infringe on the distribution of an arm necessary to protect the home
but not on the ability to use an arm to protect the home. 70 In this case,
64. See id. at 171.
65. See Roberts, supra note 62, at 495–96. A rational relationship requires less than
a reasonable relationship. See id. In corporate law, the business judgment rule requires directors’
decisions to be “attributed to any rational business purpose.” Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol.
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,
720 (Del. 1971)). The court does not measure reasonability when considering directors’
judgments. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). Further, a definition of
rational per Merriam Webster explains it as “having reason or understanding” and “relating
to, based on, or agreeable to reason.” Rational, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2003). Therefore, a rational decision or law can have some reason or be related to
reason, but it need not be reasonable.
66. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). This case discusses rational basis review
in the context of the Equal Protection Clause. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Nonetheless,
application of rational basis review in the context of the Second Amendment would follow
the same logic.
67. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
68. Id. For a discussion of the implications of footnote 27 in Heller, see generally
H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and the Future
of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217 (2011).
69. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010).
70. Of course, if the regulation restricted distribution in such a way that precluded
use, the regulation would violate the right to bear arms—both with regard to forming a
militia and to defending the home.
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perhaps, the Second Amendment could serve a purpose under rational
basis review—or under a review of a similar nature.71 However, until the
courts and legal community define the scope of the individual right protected
by the Second Amendment, an assertion that rational basis review would
deem the Second Amendment pointless seems, at least at this point in the
history of Second Amendment jurisprudence, too strong.
2. Intermediate and Strict Scrutiny
This Section purposefully deals with both intermediate and strict scrutiny;
an understanding of one depends on an understanding of the other.
In general, intermediate scrutiny requires the government to show that
the challenged regulation serves an important interest and that the means
used are substantially related to that interest.72 Strict scrutiny requires the
regulation to be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling [state] interest.”73
Courts apply intermediate scrutiny when the regulation does not infringe
on the core right of the Second Amendment but does place a substantial
burden on the right.74 Courts apply strict scrutiny when the regulation infringes
on the core right of the Second Amendment.75 Oddly, from 2008 to 2016,
challenges reviewed under strict scrutiny had a higher success rate than
challenges reviewed under intermediate scrutiny.76 This calls into question
71. See the discussion of the Commerce Clause infra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2. The
Commerce Clause analysis required by the solution’s third prong can act as an effective
substitute for rational basis review by ensuring that a regulation at the very fringes of the
individual right receives a level of review beyond mere legislative rationality.
72. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641.
73. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 465 (2007) (plurality opinion).
74. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013). It appears
that only federal courts engage in a core analysis on a regular basis. Ruben & Blocher,
supra note 60, at 1500. This is the result, perhaps, of a move away from the Marzzarella
two-part test at the state level. Id.; see also United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89
(3d Cir. 2010) (asking a court to evaluate whether a law burdens some Second Amendment
conduct, and, if it does, to “evaluate the law under some form of means-end scrutiny”).
This difference might explain why more federal Second Amendment claims have success
than do their state counterparts. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 60, at 1475–77. For
example, the success rate of Second Amendment claims in the Ninth Circuit was 13%, 4/31,
while the success rates of Second Amendment claims in the state courts of states that make
up the Ninth Circuit was 0%, 0/75. Id.
75. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives,
700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012). Note, however, that this is not as binary a rule as it may
seem. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 60, at 1500 (showing that not every determination
that a regulation burdened the core right led to a strict scrutiny review; of the six regulations
surveyed that burdened the core right, four received strict scrutiny while two received
intermediate scrutiny). This, in turn, demonstrates the manipulability of the levels of scrutiny
and, consequently, a reason for moving toward this Comment’s proposed balancing test.
76. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 60, at 1495. The success rate for strict scrutiny
was 19%, 5/27. Id. The success rate for intermediate scrutiny was 10%, 24/242. Id. Admittedly,

1142

GAARDER-FEINGOLD_56-4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 56: 1129, 2019]

12/13/2019 11:08 AM

Another Shot at Rectifying Heller Ambiguities
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the effectiveness, from a doctrinal standpoint, of applying levels of scrutiny
to Second Amendment claims. The data indicates that the courts are more
likely to accept a regulation infringing on the core right than they are to
accept a regulation not burdening the core right.77 For example, imagine
a court that deals with fifty Second Amendment challenges. It considers
ten challenges under strict scrutiny and forty challenges under intermediate
scrutiny. It chooses which level of scrutiny based on the distinction described
above. Of the forty reviewed under intermediate scrutiny, the court accepts
eight as having a substantial relationship to an important interest, or 20%.
Of the ten reviewed under strict scrutiny, the court accepts three as having
a narrowly tailored, compelling interest, or 30%. Therefore, the court views
regulations infringing on the core right more favorably than it does regulations
not burdening the core right. To debunk this interpretation, one has to assume
that the legislature wrote the regulations subject to intermediate scrutiny
more ineffectively than it wrote the regulations subject to strict scrutiny—
a questionable assumption at best. Or, one has to assume the false premise
that more compelling reasons exist to infringe on the core right than important
reasons to place a substantial burden on the right.78 Otherwise, the courts’
actions, like the example above, are perplexing and indicative of a
misunderstanding, or misapplication, of these two levels of scrutiny.
Further, the preceding discussion assumed courts could determine whether
to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny based on the regulations’ infringement
on the core right. However, defining intermediate and strict scrutiny on this
basis creates problems because courts have yet to concretely and adequately
define the core right.79
the difference in the number of suits brought under each level is quite large. However, a
reasonable person would infer that if 10% of the suits brought under intermediate scrutiny
passed, regulations challenged under strict scrutiny would pass at a rate lower than 10%,
regardless of the number of suits.
77. See supra notes 74, 76 and accompanying discussion.
78. This is a false premise because all compelling interests are important but not all
important interests are compelling. Further, all interests pertaining to the core of the right apply
to a substantial burden on the right but not all interests pertaining to a substantial burden
on the right apply to the core of the right.
79. See, e.g., Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 244 (5th Cir. 2018) (discussing the
concealed carry of weapons on the University of Texas campus and holding that because
the phrase “well-regulated” cannot limit the individual right, there can be no restriction that
individuals carrying concealed weapons be “well-regulated”); Peruta v. County of San Diego,
824 F.3d 919, 939–40 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (holding that the Second Amendment
individual right does not protect any member of the general public to carry concealed firearms
in any degree); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431–32 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[E]ven if some
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Overall, the application of intermediate and strict scrutiny to the Second
Amendment individual right is as unclear as it is problematic.
3. The Result: No Clarity
In the end, the levels of scrutiny appear clear but lack clarity when
applied to most constitutional rights.80 This lack of clarity becomes fully
exposed when dealing with the Second Amendment and, thus, supports a
narrow conception of the individual right and a move toward a balancing
test.
C. A Brief Answer to the Heller Ambiguities
This Comment will seek to answer the two ambiguities left unanswered
in Heller: the scope of the right and the proper level of scrutiny to apply
to the right. With regards to the scope of the individual right, this Comment
demands a narrow reading that limits the right to arms necessary to defend
the home. It will reach this conclusion by demonstrating, first, that any
reading of the right otherwise will open up the potential for nearly all arms
to receive the protection of the individual right81 and, second, that at least
some courts have already adopted the narrow right. With regards to the
proper level of scrutiny, this Comment proposes a move away from the
traditional levels of scrutiny. It proposes a three-prong test. Prong one will
ask whether or not the proposed regulation infringes upon one’s right to
arms necessary to defend the home. If the right is infringed, prong two
will ask whether or not the benefit of such a regulation outweighs the burden
on the right.82 Prong three will come into effect when the court determines

protected right to carry arms outside the home exists, the challenged requirement that
applicants demonstrate a ‘justifiable need’ to obtain a permit to carry a handgun for self-defense
qualifies as a ‘longstanding,’ and ‘presumptively lawful’ regulation.”); infra Part III.
80. The line between rules and standards is blurred, if not nonexistent. An argument for
one becomes an argument for the other in another context. For an analysis of the pros and
cons of rules and standards, see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 557 (1992) (choosing between rules and standards
affects costs, which in turn “illuminates concerns about the over- and under-inclusiveness
of rules relative to standards”).
81. This Comment posits that this is a bad result. To argue otherwise, one has to assert
that protecting arms such as machine guns with the protection afforded by a constitutional
right is facially good. Further, even if the Second Amendment right does not protect a certain
arm, this Comment does not purport that one could not own that arm via another legal right.
82. Levels of scrutiny involve similar balancing tests. See Ellis, supra note 57, at
1349. However, this proposed balancing test does not muddle with levels of scrutiny language
or supposed formality. Its goal is clarity of application. See infra Part IV for a discussion
of why a balancing approach absent any relationship to a purported level of scrutiny will
lead to such clarity.
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that the individual right has not been infringed—much like traditional rational
basis review. This prong asks the court to engage in a Commerce Clause,
or Dormant Commerce Clause, analysis to determine whether or not a challenged
regulation exceeds Congress’s or a state’s power to regulate interstate
commerce.83 If a regulation does, it cannot stand. This prong effectively
asks a court to begin differentiating between arms to which one has a
constitutional right and arms to which one has a nonconstitutional right. The
success of the three-prong test turns on a concrete, narrow conception of the
individual right. The three-prong test will continue to take shape as the analysis
unfolds.
To fully explain the ideas and proposals explained above, this Comment
will consist of five additional parts. Part II will provide a brief history of
the treatment of the Second Amendment over the years. It will examine several
cases before Miller and several pre-Miller cases that explicitly reject the
notion that the Second Amendment creates an individual right to bear arms.
Also, it will briefly present noteworthy Second Amendment and Commerce
Clause cases between Miller and Heller. Lastly, it will canvas the legal landscape
post-Heller. Part III will argue for a narrow reading of the Heller individual
right; courts should limit the right to those arms necessary to defend the
home. Part IV will analyze cases that unknowingly follow aspects of the
proposed solution. Part V will engage with other proposed solutions to ascertain
where each falls short and where each provides valid points. Part VI will
flesh out the proposed solution and consider future steps.
II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT OVER THE YEARS
The following Sections will explore the prevalence and interpretations
of Second Amendment analysis over three key periods: before Miller, after
Miller but before Heller, and after Heller. This background will demonstrate
the confusion and inconsistency that have plagued Second Amendment
jurisprudence. Furthermore, this discussion will introduce the concepts
necessary to support this Comment’s construction of the narrow individual
right.
A. The Second Amendment Before Miller
During the period before Miller, the Second Amendment did not dominate
the decisions of the Supreme Court, and it certainly remained on the periphery
83.

See infra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2.
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of any decision that did make note of it.84 When mentioned, the Court
would discuss the Second Amendment either as lacking a protection for
the individual right to bear arms or as a means to explain that constitutional
rights are generally limited.85
For example, in the 1894 case Miller v. Texas, the Court affirmed the
limits of the Second Amendment.86 The Court found that a Texas law that
forbade carrying a weapon on a public street did not violate the Second
Amendment.87 In its analysis, the Court defined the Second Amendment
right as “the right of the people to keep and bear arms.”88 However, the
Court did not construe the presence of that phrase to create an unbridled
individual right. Similarly, the 1897 case Robertson v. Baldwin reaffirmed
Miller v. Texas when the Supreme Court determined that “the right of the
people to keep and bear arms is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying
of concealed weapons.”89 Again, the Court framed the Second Amendment
as the right of the people to “keep and bear [a]rms”90 but did not use that
phrase to create an unbridled individual right. Each case implies that although
an individual may own an arm, the Second Amendment does not necessarily
protect the right to an arm outside of using that arm in furtherance of a forming
a militia.91 That right does not extend to individual use that one would gain
from carrying a concealed weapon or from carrying a weapon not with the
aims of forming a militia.
The reasoning adopted by each case supports a narrow reading of the
individual right. The basis for creating the individual right in Heller rests

84. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 597 (1900) (asserting that the Second
Amendment does not apply to the states), abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897) (concluding that the Second
Amendment does not protect a right to concealed carry); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535,
538 (1894) (concluding that the Second Amendment does not protect a right to concealed
carry); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 287 (1892) (invoking the Second Amendment to
declare its limited scope), abrogated by Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Mathew
S. Nosanchuk, The Embarrassing Interpretation of the Second Amendment, 29 N. KY. L.
REV. 705, 730–37 (2002).
85. See Nosanchuk, supra note 84, at 730–37.
86. Miller, 153 U.S. at 538.
87. Id. The Court notes that even if the Second Amendment applied, the Second
Amendment only restricts federal power and not “proceedings in state courts.” Id. The Court
would not incorporate the Second Amendment until 2010. McDonald v. City of Chicago,
561 U.S. 742, 746 (2010). This delay supports the conclusion that, for most of its history,
the Second Amendment acted as a check on a potentially tyrannical federal government;
it did not act as a check on oppressive state governments because state constitutions already had
provisions securing the right to form a militia. See YOUNG, supra note 22, at xxvi.
88. Miller, 153 U.S. at 538.
89. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281–82 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
91. See Miller, 153 U.S. at 538; see also Robertson, 165 U.S. at 282.
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in the phrase “the right of the people to keep and bear [a]rms.”92 If that
phrase can also support an argument for the lack of an individual right,93
then any attempt to expand that right beyond the narrow right identified
in Heller94 would collapse for lack of concrete support.95 Further, these
two cases also show that Heller deviated from precedent, which can provide
additional support for using a balancing test even if disallowed by Justice
Scalia.96
B. After Miller, but Before Heller
The Supreme Court did not make any decision changing the scope of
the Second Amendment between the Miller and Heller decisions.97 However,
the 200198 Fifth Circuit case United States v. Emerson expressed in dicta
that the Second Amendment protected the individual right to bear arms.99
The court asserted that this conclusion did not conflict with the Miller
holding because the arm at issue, a pistol, was not “of the general kind or

92. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
93. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
94. Id. at 635.
95. For a complete discussion of the reason for construing the Heller right narrowly,
see infra Part IV.
96. For a complete discussion of the validity of the balancing test, see infra Parts
V, VI. Further, Heller deviated from precedent by creating an individual right unrelated
to forming a militia. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35; United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174,
178 (1939). In general, precedent carries value but it does not shield a decision from
modification or abrogation. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (rejecting
the separate but equal doctrine established by Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896));
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 413–14 (1937) (overruling the freedom to
contract established by Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). However, the Court
does not deviate from precedent without careful consideration because “[l]iberty finds no
refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844
(1992). This justification for adhering to precedent also justifies disregarding precedent
that creates confusion.
97. See Roland K. Weekley, This Powder Keg Is About to Explode: The Lack of Standards
in Reviewing Second Amendment Cases, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 496, 498 (2017).
98. This would be the first instance in the 210 year history of the Second Amendment
that a court would recognize an individual right to bear arms, albeit in dicta. See Robert
Hardaway, Elizabeth Gormley & Bryan Taylor, The Inconvenient Militia Clause of the
Second Amendment: Why the Supreme Court Declines to Resolve the Debate Over the
Right to Bear Arms, 16 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 41, 43 (2002). Prior to this, courts
adhered to the reasoning advanced by Miller that there existed no right to bear arms absent
a relationship to forming a militia. Id.
99. 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001).
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type excluded by Miller.”100 Miller explained that the sawed-off shotgun
was not “any part of the ordinary military equipment [and] that its use could
[not] contribute to the common defense.”101
In a way, both Courts’ analyses turn on the Blackstonian102 concept that
prohibits carrying or using “dangerous or unusual weapons.”103 The Miller
Court does so to reject the notion that a sawed-off shotgun found usual
use in military service.104 The Emerson court manipulated the phrase to
suppose that the Miller Court opposed the individual right, not because
the Second Amendment supports the right of the individual to bear arms
only in furtherance of forming a militia, but because a sawed-off shotgun
is unusual and dangerous.105 In other words, the Emerson court inferred
that the Miller Court believed in the presence of an individual right in the
Second Amendment but that the right would not extend to a dangerous or
unusual arm; however, the Miller Court based its decision on the premise
that the unusual and dangerous classification limits the right to form a
militia and not on the premise that the Second Amendment protects the
individual’s use of all arms but protects those that are unusual and dangerous.106
One can then argue that the Emerson court concluded that there is an individual
right to a pistol because pistols are ordinary and not dangerous when compared
to more advanced guns. Therefore, although Emerson claimed not to conflict
with the Miller holding, an analysis of the underlying arguments reveals
that the Emerson court misinterprets, or at least misreads, the Miller Court’s
reason for deeming constitutional the regulation restricting the sale or transfer
of sawed-off shotguns.

100. Id. Some commentators agree with Emerson’s description of the holding in Miller.
See, e.g., Funk, supra note 41, at 782; Halbrook, supra note 41, at 165.
101. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (citing Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158
(1840)); see also Whet Moser, Gun Control in the Age of Al Capone, CHI. MAG. (July 25,
2012), https://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/The-312/July-2012/Gun-Controlin-the-Age-of-Al-Capone [https://perma.cc/KC2M-HLWZ] (asserting that Miller would
have come out differently had the citizens used sawed-off shotguns at the founding). Note
that this assertion omits to consider the second half of the Court’s argument: an arm must
be in common use but must also be rationally related to military service. Miller, 307 U.S.
at 178. Arguably, a sawed-off shotgun fails prong two when owned by someone not in the
military because an arm cannot be rationally related to military service if the arm-bearer has no
relationship to the military.
102. William Blackstone served on the English Court of Common Pleas, lectured on
the common law, and, most famously, wrote a series of commentaries on the law. Emily
Kadens, Justice Blackstone’s Common Law Orthodoxy, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1553, 1554
(2009). Blackstone believed in the authority of the past, held an unwavering commitment
to precedent, and did not endorse judicial discretion. Id. at 1585, 1589, 1592.
103. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148–49.
104. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
105. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001).
106. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178; infra Section III.A.
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Interestingly, Justice Scalia would later use the same logic as that of
Emerson when explaining how the individual right does not conflict with
Miller.107 Justice Scalia proposed that Miller merely held that the Second
Amendment did not protect “those weapons not typically possessed by lawabiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short barreled shotguns.”108
The Miller Court did hold that the Second Amendment did not protect
“unusual and dangerous”109 weapons, but to insist that the Court did not
relate that to the formation of a well-regulated militia ignores the very
language the Court used.110
Emerson did not share Miller’s disdain for the individual right.111 However,
before the decision in Emerson, several circuit court cases did find, in
accordance with Miller, that the Second Amendment supports only a right
to form a militia and not an individual right to use arms otherwise.112 These
cases use both the plain language of the Second Amendment and the
relationship espoused in the Miller holding to reach their conclusions.113
Without much deliberation or consternation, these cases assert that the
Second Amendment affirms only a right to form a militia. The cavalier nature
with which these cases accept as fact that the Second Amendment protects
only a right to form a militia demonstrates that the individual right exists
more readily for those parties looking for it. This is not to say that the

107. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).
108. Id. at 625.
109. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
110. Id. Some scholars argue that the right of the individual to bear an arm for the
purpose of forming a militia implies that the individual has a right to bear arms. See supra
references at note 41. However, that analysis makes a logical leap, which is explained supra
note 32.
111. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001). Do note that
some cases agree with Emerson that Miller did not support the right to form a militia but
instead implied an individual right. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 393
(D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). However, the discussion above should demonstrate
that such a reading is generally unfounded.
112. See, e.g., Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999)
(“Whatever questions remain unanswered, Miller and its progeny do confirm that the Second
Amendment establishes no right to possess a firearm apart from the role possession of a
gun might play in maintaining a state militia.” (citing United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d
1265, 1271–72 (11th Cir. 1997))); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[E]ven
as against federal regulation, the [Second] [A]mendment does not confer an absolute
individual right to bear any type of firearm.”); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106
(6th Cir. 1976) (“It is clear that the Second Amendment guarantees a collective right rather
than an individual right.”).
113. See discussion supra note 43.
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individual right does not exist, just that it may be harder to find. It may
require, though, a narrow reading of the right.
1. The Commerce Clause’s Relationship to the Second Amendment
Because the third prong of this Comment’s proposed solution asks courts
to engage in a Commerce Clause analysis114 when a regulation does not
infringe upon the right to use an arm necessary to defend the home, it is important
to briefly discuss two Commerce Clause cases decided before Heller.
Neither United States v. Lopez,115 nor Gonzales v. Raich,116 deal with the
Second Amendment, but a comparison of each case’s interpretation of the
Commerce Clause demonstrates how a court could apply the Commerce
Clause to a Second Amendment regulation.
Lopez determined that the Gun Free Schools Act violated the Commerce
Clause.117 The Gun Free Schools Act prohibited an individual from possessing
a firearm in a school zone.118 The Petitioner did not raise Second Amendment
claims at the appellate level,119 so such claims were not before the Supreme
Court. In a rare instance in the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence,120
the Court found that Congress had overstepped its authority because possessing
a firearm at a school does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.121
But, such strict interpretation did not last. In Raich, the Supreme Court
held that the intrastate production of marijuana fell under the purview of

114. Commerce Clause analysis asks whether “the regulated activity ‘substantially
affects’ interstate commerce.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995), superseded
by statutes, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, § 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125–26 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1));
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 657, 110 Stat.
3009, 3009, 269–71 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)). Interstate commerce
includes the channels of interstate commerce. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113–
14 (1941). It also includes those intrastate activities that affect interstate commerce. Shreveport
Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 360 (1914). Further, the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
provides that a state may not create a law that “intrudes upon Congress’s constitutional prerogative
to regulate trade between the states and with foreign nations.” Rousso v. Washington, 204
P.3d 243, 246 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). In essence, the Dormant Commerce Clause means
that the states cannot restrict interstate trade. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986).
115. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
116. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
117. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1988).
119. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1364 n.46 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 514 U.S.
549 (1995).
120. See Alex Kreit & Aaron Marcus, Raich, Health Care, and the Commerce Clause,
31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 957, 964 (2005) (“The last time the Supreme Court held a federal
action unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause before Lopez, was 1936.” (citing Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936))).
121. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
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Congress’s Commerce Clause authority,122 which reaffirmed the strength
of the Commerce Clause.
It is important to differentiate between Lopez and Raich. Lopez dealt
with a sort of time, place, and manner restriction on the use of guns.123 Raich
dealt with the manufacture and distribution of marijuana.124 Therefore,
the Commerce Clause seems to allow Congress to regulate manufacturing
and distribution activities but not where, when, and how an item is used.
This may seem problematic under this Comment’s solution, but it is not.
The narrow individual right will determine where, when, and how one can
use an arm.125 Therefore, the third prong, the Commerce Clause prong, will
deal with arms regulations falling outside of the individual right; it will deal
with the regulation of arms unnecessary to the defense of the home and with
regulations pertaining to the manufacture and distribution of arms protected
by the narrow individual right.126
For example, consider a regulation that limits the legal carrying capacity
of a semiautomatic rifle to ten rounds.127 This regulation does not infringe
upon the narrow conception of the individual right because ten rounds are not
necessary—assume—to defend the home. Therefore, the court would have
to consider whether the Commerce Clause would permit this regulation by
asking if the regulation is substantially related to interstate commerce.

122. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15–33 (2005).
123. The time, place, and manner doctrine allows for reasonable regulation of speech
when the regulation is concerned with the time, place, and manner of the speech and not the
content of the speech. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98–99 (1972).
Such a distinction does not translate to the Second Amendment because the time, place,
and manner in which one uses an arm are the essence of the right. If the time, place, and
manner doctrine were transplanted into Second Amendment cases, a court would need
to distinguish between a time, place, and manner regulation and a regulation infringing on
the abstract protection of the right—to defend one’s self or to stand up against oppressive
governments. In the case of the Second Amendment, this distinction is hard to define because
the time, place, and manner in which one uses an arm is inextricably linked to the right’s
prevailing theme.
124. Raich, 545 U.S. at 3.
125. See infra Part IV.
126. See infra Part IV.
127. See Duncan v. Becerra, 742 F. App’x 218, 221 (9th Cir. 2018). In this case,
plaintiffs challenged a California law that would have limited magazine capacity to ten
rounds. Id. The court issued an injunction because it believed that such a law would likely
violate plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights. Id. Note that this court does not adhere to
the narrow conception of the right advanced in infra Part III.
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Also, consider a regulation mandating that one cannot transport, via car,
a loaded handgun from one residence to another.128 This regulation does
not infringe on where, when, and how one can use an arm protected by the
narrow individual right but rather on the movement of that arm through
commerce. The court would then consider whether or not the regulation
substantially relates to interstate commerce in such a way that precludes
using arms protected by the narrow right.129
In the end, these two Commerce Clause cases present a relevant distinction
between regulations regarding when, where, and how to use a good and
regulations regarding the manufacture and distribution of goods. This
framework is of special importance when applied to the narrow individual
right. This framework will force the courts to clarify two distinctions: first,
between the right to use arms necessary to defend the home but not to purchase
or distribute those arms at will and, second, between arms to which citizens
have an individual, constitutional right and the arms to which citizens have
the nonconstitutional, legal right to own—like a hunting rifle.130
2. The Dormant Commerce Clause’s Relationship to State
Regulation of the Second Amendment
The preceding discussion of the Commerce Clause assumes a federal
regulation. The Commerce Clause does not explicitly affect the states’ ability
to regulate goods.131 However, the Dormant Commerce Clause, in effect,
does.132 A court confronted with a state regulation would ask whether or not
such a regulation would extend beyond the federal government’s ability to
impose such a regulation.133 For example, a state regulation that invokes the
Dormant Commerce Clause might disallow the importation of handguns and
allow only state-made handguns.134 This regulation does not infringe on the
128. This is the effect of the regulation at issue in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v.
City of New York, 883 F.3d 45, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019).
129. See id. The court decided that the regulation was related to interstate commerce
and, thus, did not violate the Commerce Clause. Id. at 68.
If a regulation substantially relates to interstate commerce but, by virtue of regulating
interstate commerce, precludes using an arm protected by the narrow right, the court would
have to reject that regulation. If, like the situation at issue here, the regulation does not
preclude the use of an arm protected by the narrow right, the court should uphold the
regulation so long as it substantially relates to interstate commerce.
130. See Blocher, supra note 13, at 176; infra Part VI.
131. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce
“among the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
132. See discussion of Rousso v. Washington, 204 P.3d 243, 246 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009),
in supra note 114 for a brief description of the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
133. See, e.g., S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984).
134. See generally Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1986)
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narrow right because one could still buy a handgun and use it to defend the
home. However, the regulation would work against the open boundaries—
that the Commerce Clause purports to foster—between states.135 Such an
application of the Dormant Commerce Clause also preserves the distinction
between regulations dealing with when, where, and how one can use an arm
necessary to defend the home and regulations dealing with the manufacture
and distribution of those, and other, arms.
Overall, this Comment’s solution does not suffer at the level of state
regulation because of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
C. The Post-Heller Legal Landscape
Seven years after Emerson expressed in dicta an individual right to bear
arms,136 Heller held that the Second Amendment protected an individual
right to bear arms.137 Justice Scalia’s majority held that the Second Amendment
protected, at least, the right to defend the home.138 Justice Scalia, however,
failed to adequately define the scope of that right and failed to indicate the
proper level of scrutiny with which to review individual right cases.139

(“[T]he Court has been concerned exclusively with preventing states from engaging in
purposeful economic protectionism.”). State protectionism refers to a state imposing a tariff, or
the like, on certain goods with the purpose of promoting domestic producers of that good;
the state protects the economic interests of the domestic producer at the expense of the
foreign producer. See id. at 1094–95.
135. See generally Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value,
63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 43 (1988) (describing the purpose of the Commerce Clause as “the
promotion of integration and interstate harmony”). Also, note that the example does not imply
that a state could not regulate the process for acquiring a handgun; perhaps a state could
require potential buyers to purchase from in-state dealers to ensure that the buyer adheres
to the state’s rules on acquiring a handgun. However, a state’s outright ban on imported handguns
for sale by licensed dealers presents a different issue than the federal regulation discussed
at length in Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 699, 701 (5th Cir. 2018).
136. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001). After Emerson,
the Fifth Circuit upheld three challenges to gun control where the regulation could have
been viewed as overbroad. See United States v. Patterson, 431 F.3d 832, 835–36 (5th Cir.
2005); United States v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632, 633–34 (5th Cir. 2003); United States
v. Herrera, 313 F.3d 882, 889 (5th Cir. 2002) (DeMoss, J., dissenting); Adam Winkler,
Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 729–30 (2007).
137. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
138. Id. at 635.
139. See id. at 634.
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Because of these ambiguities, confusion and inconsistency have marred
the post-Heller legal landscape.140 For nearly two years after District of
Columbia v. Heller, it was unclear if the individual right applied to the states.
In a lengthy and dense decision, McDonald v. City of Chicago ultimately
incorporated the Heller Second Amendment right to bear arms via the
Fourteenth Amendment.141 Incorporating the right to bear arms makes it
ever more imperative to settle on a proper interpretation of that right
and the correct test to apply to that right.
Initially, courts followed a two-prong test promulgated by the Third Circuit
case United States v. Marzzarella.142 This test asks whether the regulation
burdens Second Amendment conduct and, if it does, to “evaluate the law under
some form of means-end scrutiny.”143 If the regulation does not impose a
burden on Second Amendment conduct, the court need do nothing.144 This
approach fails to clarify effectively the distinction between arms as a right
and as a good.
The Seventh Circuit has entirely disregarded Heller’s prohibition of a
balancing test.145 The Seventh Circuit explained that regulations that place a
heavier burden on the right would require more justification than those laws
imposing a lesser burden on the right.146 This test balances the burden on the
right against the reason for the law, which the second prong of this Comment’s
solution aims to do. A recent Article proposed a similar approach to the
Seventh Circuit’s, wherein the court’s application of intermediate or strict
scrutiny depends on how much the restriction burdens the individual right.147
However, that same Article admits that very little differentiates intermediate

140. See generally Aryn Sedore, Comment, Moving Targets: Roving Standards of Review
in Second Amendment Cases, 11 J. MARSHALL L.J. 60 (2017–2018) (exploring the varied
standards of review in Second Amendment cases). Interestingly, the issue of what level
of scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment individual right cases predated Heller but
existed more as a thought experiment than as a concrete legal question; each writer would
have to assume an individual right. See Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment
Jurisprudence: Firearms Disabilities and Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 4 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 157, 189 (1999); Winkler, supra note 136, at 685.
141. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 746 (2010).
142. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d. Cir. 2010); see Binderup v.
Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 347–56 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc); United States v.
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680–83 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–
04 (10th Cir. 2010).
143. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.
144. Id.
145. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011).
146. Id.; see Ellis, supra note 57, at 1349.
147. Elke C. Meeùs, Article, The Second Amendment in Need of a Shot in the Arm:
Overhauling the Courts’ Standards of Scrutiny, 45 W. ST. L. REV. 29, 73 (2017).
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and strict scrutiny, and a court could use either level of scrutiny to reach
the same results.148
Four years after the Seventh Circuit presented its balancing test, it proclaimed
that searching for the proper level of scrutiny would not “resolve any
concrete dispute.”149 Instead, the court adopted the Miller relationship test
with an additional prong that asked whether, under the regulation, citizens
would “retain adequate means of self-defense.”150 The court also believed
it important to ask whether the regulation banned weapons common at
ratification.151 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s new test determines whether
or not the regulation would infringe on the right to adequate self-defense
with an ill-advised152 history element. The adjective “adequate” implies
that although the individual right is limited by the defense of self and home,
that limited right of self-defense is in itself limited.153 This is a narrow
reading of the narrowest version of the individual right permitted by Heller.
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit has not viewed Second Amendment
challenges as unfavorably as other circuits.154
In general, the application of intermediate versus strict scrutiny varies
across the circuit courts without much predictability or reason.155 The
inconsistency in both the tests applied and the outcomes of similar cases
is the result of the failure to define basic Second Amendment issues,156 such
as the scope of the individual right. Thus, a successful argument for a revised
approach to Second Amendment individual right cases must first concretely
define the scope of that right.

148. Id. at 70; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“When a court becomes preoccupied with abstract standards, it risks
sacrificing common sense at the altar of formal consistency.”).
149. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See infra Section V.A for a discussion of the issues inherent in a history test.
153. See infra Section V.A for a discussion of the issues inherent in a history test.
154. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 60, at 1475. Second Amendment challenges
in the Seventh Circuit had a 16% success rate. Id. It trailed only the D.C. Circuit, 64%, and the
Second Circuit, 18%. Id.
155. See id. at 1507–08.
156. See Sedore, supra note 140, at 76.
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III. A NARROW CONCEPTION OF THE HELLER INDIVIDUAL RIGHT
Heller left the scope of the individual right undetermined.157 However,
it asserted that the right should at least encompass the right of “law-abiding,
responsible citizens” to use arms to defend the home.158 When pressed
about the vagueness of the individual right by Justice Breyer, Justice Scalia
explained that, in the past, the Supreme Court failed to completely define
the scope of certain First Amendment rights when engaging with them for
the first time.159 Although Justice Scalia’s assertion is true, he fails to
recognize that First Amendment rights generally work from maximum
protections and impose limits rather than work from minimum protections
and grant expansions.160 In other words, a First Amendment right protects
abstract ideas that courts pare down and mold with case law.161 Justice
Scalia asks courts to build from the ground up to the individual right rather
than to define that right by paring down a general right.162 Consequently,
Section III.C of the following discussion will demonstrate that the courts
deal not with the individual right to bear arms but deal with the individual
right to defend the home. Section III.C will show that this distinction demands
adherence to a narrow conception of the individual right.

157. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
158. Id.
159. Id. (comparing the Court’s first attempt to define the Free Exercise Clause in
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879)).
160. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167. This case works from a maximum right of the
complete free exercise of religion and pares that down to exclude the free exercise of religion
with regards to polygamy because of a pressing governmental interest. See id.
Further, the First Amendment protects the right to free speech. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Subsequent decisions by the courts have qualified that otherwise absolute protection of free
speech. Also, the Fourteenth Amendment provides for “equal protection of the laws.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. Subsequent decisions have explained situations where that seemingly
absolute protection does not apply. Comparatively, the Second Amendment individual right
advanced by Justice Scalia protects at least the right to bear arms in defense of the home.
Justice Scalia then asks the courts to expand on the otherwise qualified individual right to
bear arms. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. This asks courts to perform a fundamentally different
function than when they analyze other constitutional rights. It asks judges to determine the
general right that extends from, supposedly, a subsidiary of that right and to not determine
what comes within an already determined general right.
This is somewhat analogous to the difference between positive and negative rights. For
a brief description of positive versus negative rights, see Richard E. Myers, Adversarial
Counsel in an Inquisitorial System, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 411, 429–30 (2011)
(explaining that a negative right demands a court find violations and that a positive right
demands a court to provide a good or service). Similar to the distinction between positive
and negative rights, Justice Scalia asks the courts to provide the boundaries of a right rather
than interpret that which falls within or outside the boundaries of a predetermined general
right.
161. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
162. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
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Overall, this Comment will argue that courts should adopt a narrow
reading of the individual right limited to a constrained version of the right
explained by Justice Scalia in Heller.163 It will argue that the right should
be limited to those arms necessary to defend the home. It will reach this
conclusion by demonstrating, first, that any reading of the right other than
a narrow view of the right will open up the potential for nearly all arms to
receive constitutional protection164 and, second, that courts have already
adopted the narrow right.
A. An Argument Against the “Common Use” Argument
Limiting the individual right to the arms necessary to defend the home165
will ensure that the right does not balloon to protect all arms. Of course,
all arms does not include the “absurd,” like tanks, nuclear bombs, or cannons.166
All arms refers to all arms, both lethal and nonlethal,167 that are in “common
use among the citizenry.”168 Some scholars assert that this, in turn, means
that the Second Amendment individual right should protect all arms in
163. See id.
164. This Comment is aware of the limitations set out in Heller. Id. at 626; see also
Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 413–16 (2009) (explaining the groups that the majority decision
excluded from the individual right to bear arms). Blocher questions why the majority
would exclude certain groups of people when it relies on an “all-inclusive reading of ‘the
people’” in the text of the Second Amendment to create an individual right. Blocher, supra, at
414. In a First Amendment setting, members, such as the mentally ill and felons, who are
excluded by Heller, retain some, if not all, rights. Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 721 (Stevens,
J., dissenting)) In at least this way, the Second Amendment presents a unique situation where
the right at issue, if used by a certain group of people, can cause situations so adverse to
the public good that they must be excluded.
165. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
166. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Second Amendment Limitations, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 233, 233–34 (2016). Reynolds uses the word “absurd” to describe these types of arms.
Id. at 233. Reynolds correctly asserts that the use of a reductio ad absurdum argument is
out of place in current Second Amendment disputes. Id. at 233–34. This Comment does
not support a narrow reading of the individual right on the grounds that it could lead to
individual citizens owning arms as extreme as tanks, nuclear bombs, and cannons.
167. See generally Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Heller and NonLethal Weapons,
60 HASTINGS L.J. 1387 (2009), for a discussion on how to treat nonlethal weapons under
Heller. The article uses Tasers as an example of a nonlethal weapon and discusses how Heller’s
emphasis on arms in common use at the time creates complications when considering arms
that may be developed in the future and may, like the Taser, be nonlethal. Id. at 1413; see
also Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1033 (2016) (implying that a stun gun could
receive protection under the Second Amendment).
168. See Reynolds, supra note 166, at 235.
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common use.169 Defining the scope of the right by what is in common use
is problematic for two reasons.
First, the breadth of other constitutional rights does not depend on what
is and what is not in common use at the time. The scope of the First Amendment
right to free speech does not ebb and flow depending on the vernacular of
the citizenry.170 The First Amendment right to free speech stands for more
than the words themselves; it stands for the ideas the words express and
the importance of free thought. The Second Amendment may stand for more
than the right to own a good—an arm—but that purpose is arguably more
closely aligned with the right of the people to form a militia than it is to the
individual right to bear arms for self-use.171 After all, the government ensures
citizens’ safety in their homes through means outside of the Second Amendment,
such as through law enforcement and criminal statutes.
Second, even if an arm is common, it does not follow that such an arm
is either necessary to defend the home or not unusually dangerous. Consider
the AR-15, the gun often used in recent mass shootings172 and the most
popular rifle.173 The AR-15 is in common use, but the AR-15 is not necessary
for defense of the home, and it could easily be argued that the AR-15 has
no place outside of the militia or military.174

169. Id.
170. Fighting words could present a situation wherein speech protected by the First
Amendment shifts with what language is likely to incite an “imminent breach of the peace.”
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (citing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.,
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 503 (Harvard Univ. Press 1967) (1941)). However,
citizens rarely use the word cicisbeo to describe a married woman’s lover, but this does not
mean that the First Amendment right to free speech does not protect using that word.
171. See Finkelman, supra note 25, at 233.
172. Kate Irby, Nobody Knows Exactly How Many Assault Rifles Exist in the U.S.—
by Design, MCCLATCHY DC BUREAU (Feb. 23, 2018, 6:21 PM), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/
news/nation-world/national/article201882739.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
173. NRA BlogStaff, Why the AR-15 Is America’s Most Popular Rifle, NRABLOG
(Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.nrablog.com/articles/2016/1/why-the-ar15-is-americas-mostpopular-rifle [https://perma.cc/SNP3-DPKT].
174. The AR-15 is designed for assault style attacks. See Greg Myre, A Brief History
of the AR-15, NPR (Feb. 28, 2018, 12:07 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/28/588861820/
a-brief-history-of-the-ar-15 [https://perma.cc/5KWP-WF5Y]. The AR-15 is not the same
weapon used by the military, but it is very similar. Id. The AR-15 has been used in almost
all of the deadliest shootings over the last ten years. Id. In Heller, Justice Scalia implied
that a complete ban of M-16s would not violate the Second Amendment. District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008). An M-16 is very similar to an AR-15. See Kastalia
Medrano, What’s the Difference Between an AR-15 & an M-16? They’re Frighteningly
Similar, BUSTLE (June 16, 2016), https://www.bustle.com/articles/167436-whats-the-differencebetween-an-ar-15-an-m16-theyre-frighteningly-similar [https://perma.cc/RV7Y-CK4U].
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Therefore, for these two reasons, the phrase “in common use at the time”175
should not create an unbridled right to whatever arms the majority of armbearing citizenry decide to use for whatever lawful purpose. To consider
it otherwise would allow for “dangerous and unusual”176 weapons to earn
the protection of a right and for potentially all arms to receive constitutional
protection.
B. The Interaction of the Individual Right with Other
Nonconstitutional Areas of Law
The preceding discussion may have prompted the following question:
But why could the right not include the right to bear arms in defense of the
home, the right to bear arms to hunt, or the right to bear arms to practice at
a shooting range?
The simple answer is that other areas of the law already protect those
activities. Custom protects the right to hunt using firearms,177 and zoning
statutes protect shooting ranges.178 Castle Statutes previously protected
the individual right created in Heller.179 But the District of Columbia ban
threatened this,180 so the Court protected it with the label of a right.181
Therefore, until other actions by the legislature threaten that which citizens
have a legal, but nonconstitutional, right to do, courts need not take any
protective measures.182 In fact, even if a piece of legislation threatened an
activity like hunting or a place like a shooting range, the cause of action
would likely implicate environmental and property laws, respectively, and
not constitutional law. Of course, constitutional law may exist at the
175. See Lerner & Lund, supra note 167, at 1392–94 (providing analysis of “in common
use at the time” versus “dangerous and unusual weapons”).
176. See id. at 1392, 1406, 1408.
177. See Blocher, supra note 13, at 176.
178. See, e.g., Platform I Shore, LLC v. Vill. of Lincolnwood, 17 N.E.3d 214, 217
(Ill. App. Ct. 2014). This case used zoning laws to permit a shooting range, not the Second
Amendment. See id. In fact, the Second Amendment was not even mentioned in the opinion.
179. See Spearlt, Firepower to the People! Gun Rights & the Law of Self-Defense to
Curb Police Misconduct, 85 TENN. L. REV. 189, 214–17 (2017). This Article explains that
most states have some version of a castle statute. See id. at 214. These statutes sometimes take
on other names like “Make My Day” and “Stand Your Ground” laws. Id. Further, this Article
asserts that a state like Virginia that does not have a castle statute, or anything of that nature,
would be unable to prosecute a citizen for using a handgun in defense of home because of
Heller. Id. at 217.
180. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008).
181. Id. at 635.
182. See Spearlt, supra note 179, at 214–15.
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fringes of such an action, but the individual right to bear arms would not
prohibit a legislature from outlawing hunting in a certain spot with the goal
of protecting a species or citizens. Perhaps the individual right could extend
to hunting activities if the legislature banned the use of arms in hunting—
but playing that game verges on the ridiculous. This relates back to the
idea that the individual right works from a minimum right as opposed to
a maximum right. This is partly because the Court created the individual
right after individual gun ownership and use were accepted activities.183
Therefore, an interpretation that limits the right to those arms necessary
to defend one’s home makes sense. This is a similar to the conclusion that
the Seventh Circuit reached in Friedman v. City of Highland Park, discussed
in Part IV.184

183. See generally TOM W. SMITH & JAESOK SON, NORC AT THE UNIV. OF CHI., GENERAL
SOCIAL SURVEY FINAL REPORT: TRENDS IN GUN OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES, 1972–
2014 (Mar. 2015), http://www.norc.org/PDFs/GSS%20Reports/GSS_Trends%20in%20Gun
%20Ownership_US_1972-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XYW-SZQ8]. This Article demonstrates
that gun ownership actually decreased—as a percentage—after 2008, the year of the Heller
decision. Id. at 4. If anything, this further demonstrates the oddity of affording the protection
of a constitutional right to a good that people already have the nonconstitutional right to
own and use. One would expect that after the implementation of the First Amendment there
would be more, not less, speech criticizing the government. However, Heller claims that
it “codified a pre-existing right,” just like the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Heller,
554 U.S. at 592. However, the right to free speech, to the equal protection of the laws, and of
the individual to bear arms have no authority without affirmation from the Court and enforcement
by the executive. Simply writing down the words does not imbue them with authority. This
does not mean that for those words to have authority, it does not matter that they were written
down or who wrote them. It means that a latent, uncodified constitutional right is not
a constitutional right at all because it could be revoked without much, if any, deliberation.
See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1942 (2008) (“[A]
lower court judge who accepts the authority of precedent . . . and a Supreme Court Justice who
accepts the authority of previous Supreme Court decisions . . . are expected to conclude
that advocacy of racial hatred is constitutionally protected even if they believe that such a
conclusion is legally erroneous.”). When Heller codified the individual right to bear arms,
it forced recognition of this right by all courts, even those in disagreement. Therefore, before
the codification of the right, certain courts could chose not to enforce, or read, an individual
right to bear arms. See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming
that the Second Amendment does not protect an individual right). However, after the codification,
all courts needed to accept the right, even if they had previously found it not to exist. See
Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. 570). Overall,
although a right may exist in theory before the Court or legislature codifies it, the force of
the constitutional right—what makes a constitutional right a constitutional right and not just a
general legal right—exists only after codification.
184. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015).
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C. The Adoption of the Narrow Right by the Courts
Perhaps for the reasons noted above, the courts do not deal with the
individual right to bear arms but instead deal with the individual right to
defend the home. The latter implicates arms, but the courts have generally
limited the arms one can use to those necessary to defend the home. For
example, New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York determined
that a restriction prohibiting the transfer of a handgun from one home to
another did not substantially burden the individual right because the restriction
did not limit one’s right to acquire a handgun for the second home.185 The
court treated the individual right narrowly. It did not extend the right to defend
one’s home to the right to defend all of one’s homes.186 It bound the specific
handgun to the specific house.187
Similarly, United States v. Henry limited the arms that one could use in
defense of the home.188 The Court concluded that a machine gun was a
“dangerous and unusual weapon[]” and, thus, unprotected under Heller.189
Although the phrase “dangerous and unusual” is not an ideal way to frame
the issue, the court still stood by a narrow reading of the individual right—
a machine gun had to be necessary for defense of the home—and limited
the type of arms covered by that right.190 Both a handgun and a machine
gun could defend a home, but only the handgun is necessary; thus, only
the handgun receives the protection of the right.191 In both cases, the courts
approach the individual right as the right to defend the home and not as the
right to bear arms.
In general, courts refer to the individual right only as the right to defend
the home.192 Even in New York State Pistol & Rifle Ass’n v. Cuomo, the
court did not construe the individual right to encompass anything more than
185. 883 F.3d 45, 57 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019) (mem.).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 688 F.3d 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2012).
189. Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008)).
190. Id.
191. A handgun is potentially more dangerous outside of the home because it can be
used in closer quarters, can be more easily concealed, and can fire more rounds quickly. See
David LaPell, Shotguns vs Handguns for Home Defense: Which Is the Better Fit?, GUNS.COM
(Aug. 31, 2017, 3:44 PM), https://www.guns.com/news/review/shotguns-vs-handgunsfor-home-defense-which-is-the-better-fit [https://perma.cc/M5G5-86HM]. However, this
is not a huge concern if the individual right is limited to using arms inside the home in defense
of the home.
192. See cases cited supra at notes 185–88.
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the right to defend the home.193 In that case, the court determined that a
New York law restricting magazine capacity to seven rounds violated the
Second Amendment.194 The Court molded its discussion about the magazine
rounds to fit within the narrow right even when it would have presumably
been easier to extend the individual right to include the right to load a magazine
with more than seven rounds.195 This indicates an unwillingness to extend,
or discomfort with extending, the individual right. Perhaps, the court felt
more comfortable parsing out the details of a right from a general protection
rather than building a general right out of a specific protection.196 In essence,
the court dealt not with an individual right to bear arms but with an individual’s
right to defend the home. If the latter is construed as the blanket, general
right, a court or challenger could imagine any number of scenarios wherein
the right to defend the home demanded any number and type of arms. Of
course, a court could limit that unbridled right.197 Therefore, because the
courts seem inclined to view the individual right to defend the home as the
general right and not the individual right to bear arms, this Comment proposes
limiting the right to defend the home to those arms necessary to do so.
Arguably, this more accurately reflects the right at issue and is more closely

193. 804 F.3d 242, 258 (2d Cir. 2015).
194. Id. at 264.
195. See id.
196. See discussion supra note 160. Courts do not traditionally have to create general
rights out of specific protections. One may argue that the Court created a right of privacy
from the “Bill of Rights or its penumbras.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
However, the Court derives the right to privacy from the right to liberty; the court did not
create the right to liberty from a right to privacy. Similarly, the court in New York State
Pistol & Rifle Ass’n v. Cuomo could have created the right to use a seven-round magazine
from a right to defend the home. It could have asserted that the right to more than seven
rounds in a magazine is part of a more general right to bear arms, which includes both the
right to more than seven-round magazines and the right to defend the home. However, it
approached the issue like the Court in Roe v. Wade and tried to wedge the right to own a
more than seven-round magazine within the right to use arms to defend the home. The
problem is that the two rights are linked only by perverse situations wherein an individual
would require not more than seven rounds of total ammunition but more than seven rounds
in a single magazine to effectively defend the home. With that logic, one could potentially
argue that any situation could arise and that any number or type of arms be required by the
situation to defend the home. Therefore, the Cuomo court’s unwillingness to expand the right
but to instead derive from the right an unrelated protection—in nearly all situations—demands
a narrow reading of the individual right.
197. This is essentially the approach that the Miller Court takes in upholding the National
Firearms Act. A sawed-off shotgun is not part of usual military services, so it is unprotected by
the Second Amendment. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). A court could
say that an AK-47 is not usually used to protect the home, so it is unprotected by the Second
Amendment. This Comment argues that the question should not be whether an arm is usually
used to protect the home but whether an arm is necessary to protect the home.
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aligned with the historical impetus of the Second Amendment—allowing
the citizen to protect his or her person.198
In the end, the case law demonstrates that the courts construe the individual
right as the right to defend the home and not as the individual right to bear
arms.
D. Conclusion: A Narrow Interpretation of the Individual Right
Courts should apply only a narrow interpretation of the individual right
for two reasons. First, the structure of the individual right requires a limited
reading or else the right could balloon to protect all arms that one could use
to defend the home and not only the arms necessary to defend the home.
The construction of the right, beginning at a minimum and working towards
a maximum, demands strict adherence to this distinction. New York State
Pistol & Rifle Ass’n v. Cuomo demonstrates how a failure to limit the right
by this distinction could allow for many arms that are sufficient, but not
necessary, to the defense of the home to receive the protection of a right.199
Second, because the right begins at a minimum and hopes to work towards
a maximum, courts already limit the interpretation of the individual right
to the right to defend the home. Effectively, the courts deal not with the
individual right to bear arms but with the individual right to defend the
home. Therefore, the individual right—which is really the individual right
to defend the home—should be limited to those arms necessary to defend
the home.
IV. THE “THREE-PRONG TEST” IN ACTION
This Comment’s three-prong test asks a court to employ a narrow reading
of the Heller individual right, balance the benefit of the challenged regulation
against its infringement on the narrow individual right, and engage in a
Commerce Clause analysis should the regulation not infringe on the individual
right. This Part will examine four instances wherein courts have unknowingly,
or without acknowledging as such, approached Second Amendment issues
by applying the proposed three-prong test or parts thereof.
As a practical legal matter, this Part aims to demonstrate that the threeprong test is administratively easier for judges to apply than traditional

198.
199.

See supra Section I.B.
Cuomo, 804 F.3d at 264.
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levels of constitutional scrutiny.200 The administrative ease of the threeprong test compared to the traditional levels of constitutional scrutiny will
become clear in the following comparison of two Second Circuit cases.201
As a matter of legal theory, this Part will argue that an efficient rule of
law202 requires consistency between the court’s interpretation of the law and
the expression of that law.203 This symmetry can help to promulgate a better
understanding of the scope of the Second Amendment individual right,
not only for the courts who create, examine, and modify the law, but also for
the public to whom the laws apply.204 Further, when courts achieve the
appropriate consistency, when their interpretations align with legal norms,205
their deliberations can guide action.206 However, in this regard, the Second
Amendment individual right poses a special challenge because of its
indeterminacy.207 The lack of clarity in the initial expression of the Second
Amendment individual right allows the courts to carve out a new, clearer
rule that will be better able to reach the symmetry between the courts’
interpretation and ultimate expression of the law.208 Therefore, the courts
have a duty to develop Second Amendment jurisprudence determinately

200. See Wright, supra note 62, at 184.
201. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45, 45–46
(2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019) (mem.); Cuomo, 804 F.3d at 242–43.
202. The rule of law is an ideal that, in its most basic form, requires people with authority
to exercise that authority in accordance with the expressed law and not in accordance with
personal belief or preference. Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA.
L. REV. 1, 6 (2008). In a system built on the discretion of judges, the rule of law will never
be fully articulated because the high court’s decision will be interpreted not by the high
court but by any number of lower courts. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–79 (1989).
203. See Waldron, supra note 202, at 6. Essentially, the courts should not purport to
use different levels of scrutiny when they are actually applying a balancing test to all regulations.
A balancing test is different than a level of scrutiny analysis because it has no threshold.
Its analysis starts from the same point for all regulations.
204. See Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory
Interpretation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1121.
205. H.L.A. Hart argues that the law derives from patterns of accepted, standard conduct.
See Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of the Law: Liberating the
Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1171 (2006). However, as society develops
it becomes increasingly more difficult to describe patterns of standard conduct where there
is common disagreement as to what the standard conduct should be—as in the context of
the Second Amendment. In this sense, a judicially created legal rule can act as a placeholder
for a legal norm when a lack of consensus threatens to derail, to some degree, a society’s
functionality. A legal rule, unlike a legal norm, is judicially designed rather than judicially
enforced. When the judiciary designs a rule, it has a continuing duty to clarify it. See Robert
S. Summers, The Principles of the Rule of Law, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1691, 1693 (1999).
206. See Waldron, supra note 202, at 57.
207. See discussion supra Parts II, III.
208. See generally Waldron, supra note 202.
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and clearly when faced with the opaque and vague aims of Justice Scalia’s
opinion.209
Four cases and courts have embraced this duty—even if unrecognized
and unacknowledged—and have begun crafting new, clearer rules to apply
to the Second Amendment individual right. In some respects, the courts’
interpretive techniques mirror this Comment’s three-prong test.
A. United States v. Colon-Quiles: A Balancing Test and a Case for
Abandoning the Traditional Levels of Scrutiny
In the first case, United States v. Colon-Quiles, the court used the proposed
balancing test under the guise of constitutional levels of scrutiny.210 The
court concluded that Congress had the power, through the Commerce Clause,
to criminalize the possession of a handgun with an obliterated serial number.211
Importantly, the court also determined that the statute at issue did not violate
the Second Amendment.212 The court adopted a similar interpretation of
the individual right to bear arms as the Seventh Circuit court in Friedman
v. City of Highland Park.213 The court’s analysis implied that the individual
right would only survive a regulation when the regulation completely prohibited
“an individual’s right to carry a firearm.”214 Like the Friedman court, the
Colon-Quiles court examined the individual right as the right to own firearms
necessary for the protection of self 215 and home and not as the right to
firearms sufficient to defend one’s self—which would include a handgun
with an obliterated serial number and demand a different analysis. The court
began with this narrow conception of the individual right.216 It then applied
intermediate scrutiny because the regulation did not infringe the right to own
a firearm but the manner in which one could exercise that right.217 By applying
intermediate scrutiny, the court determined that the regulation would pass
209. See Summers, supra note 205, at 1693, 1696.
210. United States v. Colon-Quiles, 859 F. Supp. 2d 229, 231–33 (D.P.R. 2012).
211. Id. The Commerce Clause applies to Puerto Rico because it is economically
integrated into the United States economy and retains autonomous power. See David M.
Helfeld, Understanding United States-Puerto Rico Constitutional and Statutory Relations
Through Multidimensional Analysis, 82 REVISTA JURÍDICA U. P.R. 841, 862 (2013); see
also Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v. Rivera Vasquez, 977 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1992).
212. Colon-Quiles, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 235.
213. 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015).
214. Colon-Quiles, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 233.
215. Id. at 233–34.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 235.

1165

GAARDER-FEINGOLD_56-4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/13/2019 11:08 AM

constitutional muster because the regulation protected the governmental
interest of promoting safety.218 The court noted in passing that the regulation
would also survive strict scrutiny.219
This case presents two interesting points. First, the court engages in a
balancing test even if it does not acknowledge it as such.220 It uses a balancing
test under the guise of the levels of scrutiny.221 It balances the regulation’s
benefits against its infringement on the narrow conception of the individual
right and concludes that the value of safety outweighs the value of protecting
the slightest infringement on the individual right.222 Under the rule of law,
it is important for the court to recognize this approach; it is important for
the court to express the law as unambiguously as possible.223 If it uses a
balancing test but purports to be using some means-end scrutiny, it fails
to express the law as clearly as it could. Lastly, it uses a Commerce Clause
analysis to engage with arms that qualify only as goods and not as rights,224
which helps to craft the scope of the individual right.
Second, the case demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the constitutional
scrutiny approach,225 especially when applied to the Second Amendment.
Presumably, the Government will always have an interest in citizens’ safety.226
This ever present interest allows the court to assert that the regulation would
also pass strict scrutiny.227 Unlike in Colon-Quiles, First Amendment regulations
rarely pass strict scrutiny.228 Strict scrutiny does not permit abridgment
of rights except in instances of a compelling, narrowly tailored governmental
interest.229 Safety of citizens, in the general sense, has not historically been
compelling or specific enough to pass strict scrutiny.230 Therefore, either
218. Id.; see Donald W. Dowd, The Relevance of the Second Amendment to Gun
Control Regulation, 58 MONT. L. REV. 79, 111 (1997). Dowd asserts that it would be rare for a
piece of gun control legislation to have no relationship to public safety. Id. Dowd argues
that such an argument by the government would not be overturned even if there were good
arguments supporting a story where public safety was not an issue. Id. at 111–12.
219. Colon-Quiles, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 234.
220. See id. at 235.
221. See id.
222. Id.
223. See supra notes 202–09.
224. See Colon-Quiles, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 233.
225. See Wright, supra note 62, at 184.
226. See Dowd, supra note 218, at 111.
227. See Colon-Quiles, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 234; Dowd, supra note 218, at 111.
228. See Burt Neuborne, Where’s the Fire?, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 131, 133–34 (2016). At the
time Neuborne wrote his Article, only two cases passed the strict scrutiny test required by
First Amendment free speech doctrine. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656,
1662 (2015); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193, 195 (1992); Colon-Quiles, 859 F. Supp.
2d at 234.
229. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418–19 (1996).
230. Id. at 2421. But see Dowd, supra note 218, at 111.
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the Colon-Quiles court did not know how to apply strict scrutiny in general
or the court did not know how to apply strict scrutiny to the Second Amendment.
It is probably a bit of both,231 but the safety concern, and concerns of a
similar nature, is not nearly as present with First Amendment cases.232
The Second Amendment affords the protection of a right to a good that can
cause extreme harm and, thus, becomes incomparable to the abstract concepts
protected by the First Amendment.233 Importing levels of scrutiny becomes
problematic because they are designed to apply to rights inherently different
from the individual right to bear arms.234 Perhaps, it is this reason that turns
courts to a Commerce Clause analysis even when discussing levels of scrutiny.235
Because the courts can so easily manipulate the levels of scrutiny, or avoid
applying them all together, it would behoove the development of Second
Amendment individual right jurisprudence to openly adopt the balancing
test so courts will more actively engage with the intricacies of the law
rather than passively engage with airy levels of constitutional scrutiny.236
B. United States v. Henry: Application of the Commerce Clause but
Failure to Apply a Narrow Conception of the
Individual Right
The second case, United States v. Henry, demonstrates a situation where
an acknowledged application of the narrow individual right leads to a clearer
application of the law. The case does adeptly apply the Commerce Clause
once it determines that the Second Amendment individual right has not
been infringed.

231. See Wright, supra note 62, at 171.
232. See Volokh, supra note 229, at 2418–19. There is, of course, the issue of incitement.
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam). This presents a safety
concern similar to that created by the Second Amendment. For an overview of the Brandenburg
doctrine, see John D. Moore, The Closed and Shrinking Frontier of Unprotected Speech,
36 WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 39–41 (2014). One can argue that the safety concern in the Second
Amendment context is incommensurable to the safety concern presented by the First
Amendment.
For an interesting comparison of the safety issues present in the Second Amendment with
those in abortion cases, see generally J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the
Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009).
233. See Dowd, supra note 218, at 109.
234. Id. at 109–10.
235. See United States v. Henry, 688 F.3d 637, 641–42 (9th Cir. 2012).
236. See Levin, supra note 204, at 1121–22.
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In Henry, the court concluded that the Second Amendment individual
right did not protect Henry’s right to own a homemade machine gun in his
home.237 The court engaged in an “unusual and dangerous” analysis, which
certainly has its flaws.238 The court finds machine guns outside of the scope
of the protection of the Second Amendment because of Heller’s recognition
that machine guns will not receive protection in most cases.239 On one hand,
this analysis merely demonstrates that a narrow conception of the individual
right, limited to those arms necessary to defend the home, does not conflict
with the underlying drive of Heller. On the other hand, Heller explained that
Second Amendment protection of machine guns would be “startling.”240
This does not mean it is forbidden. In Henry, Henry kept the machine gun
in his home,241 presumably for the purpose of protecting himself. Protection
of the home lies at the core of the Second Amendment individual right.242
However, the Henry court did not consider the possibility that a machine
gun used to protect the home might qualify as the “startling” exception
implied by Heller.243 Even though the Henry court engages in an “unusual
and dangerous” analysis, an application of the narrow individual right
proffered in Part III would have yielded the same result. A machine gun
might be sufficient to protect a home, but it is by no means necessary. Because
the “unusual and dangerous” test has its flaws244 and because the Heller right
does not conflict with this Comment’s narrow reading of the individual right,245
openly applying such a narrow reading will help all courts meet their duty

237. Henry, 688 F.3d at 639–40.
238. Id. at 640; see discussion of unusual and dangerous supra Part III.
239. Henry, 688 F.3d at 639–40.
240. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624 (2008); see Gun Control Act,
18 U.S.C § 922(o) (2012). But see United States v. One Palmetto Armory, 822 F.3d 136,
142 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that the Second Amendment does not protect the use of
machine guns). See generally Peter J. Adonizio Jr., Comment, Militias, Muskets, and Machine
Guns? The Third Circuit Furthers Inapplicability of Second Amendment Protection to
Machine Gun Protection in United States v. One Palmetto State Armory, 62 VILL. L. REV.
483 (2017) (discussing the relationship between the Gun Control Act of 1968’s 1986
amendment and the holding of Heller).
241. Henry, 688 F.3d at 639.
242. Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–25; United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596,
599–600 (2009). But see Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense in Tort
and Criminal Law, Grammatically-Correct Originalism, and Other Second Amendment
Musings, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1205, 1220 (2009) (“[O]ne might argue that the right to keep
and bear arms for militia-service purposes constitutes the core of the right . . . .”).
243. Henry, 688 F.3d at 639–40.
244. See supra discussion of unusual and dangerous in Part III.
245. Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–39.
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to carve out new, clearer rules from the ambiguity that is the Second
Amendment individual right.246
Interestingly, because the individual right was not implicated, the Henry
court did not consider which level of scrutiny to apply.247 Taking Henry and
Colon-Quiles together, it would seem that a court could avoid the question
of which level of scrutiny to apply regardless of whether or not the regulation
infringes on the individual right.248 The confusion surrounding the individual
right could explain the courts’ avoidance of the question, or perhaps, and
more believably, the courts’ engagement with the constitutional levels of
scrutiny does not reflect the actual interpretive techniques used. As mentioned
in the discussion of Colon-Quiles, levels of scrutiny seem ill-equipped to deal
with the Second Amendment right to a good when traditionally levels of scrutiny
have protected abstract, amorphous concepts.249 Therefore, an application
of levels of scrutiny to Second Amendment individual right cases fails to
express the courts’ interpretations of the law without ambiguity and is, thus,
ineffective.250
After determining that the Second Amendment individual right did not
apply, the Henry court analyzed Henry’s right to own a homemade machine
gun under the Commerce Clause.251 The court found that the Commerce Clause
afforded Congress the power to regulate homemade machine guns.252
Importantly, the court notes that Heller did not mention the Commerce Clause,

246. See Summers, supra note 205, at 1693. The judge-made rule is the placeholder for
the legal norm, so to be effective and to be understood by the public, it must meet a certain level
of clarity.
247. Henry, 688 F.3d at 640.
248. See Wright, supra note 62, at 184.
249. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The right to free speech,
freedom of religion, freedom of association, and equal protection of the laws all protect abstract
concepts. The Second Amendment may protect an abstract concept to stand up against an
oppressive government, but that is arguably too general; the First Amendment also protects
the citizens’ right to stand up to an oppressive government. It protects a right to a concrete
good that is but one way to stand up to an oppressive government. However, the First, Second,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights are all abstract. An abstract right is one that is general
and that, thus, comes into conflict with other abstract rights. See Note, Protecting the Public
Interest: Nonstatutory Suits by the United States, 89 YALE L.J. 118, 130–31 (1979) (explaining
a situation wherein an abstract right to privacy could come into conflict with an abstract right
to publish). Rights become concrete when a court determines which abstract right trumps
another. Id. at 131. For example, does the right to life trump the right to bear arms?
250. See Waldron, supra note 202, at 34.
251. Henry, 688 F.3d at 640–41.
252. Id.
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so the individual right should not modify analysis under the Commerce
Clause.253
C. A Comparison of Two Second Circuit Cases: Clarity Achieved with a
Balancing Test and not with Purported Levels of Scrutiny
Next, a comparison of two Second Circuit cases, New York State Rifle &
Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n
v. Cuomo, demonstrates that relying on the levels of scrutiny results in a muddled
opinion and that an adherence to the three-prong test prompts a clearer
opinion. Adherence to the three-prong test also results in a better defined
expression of the individual right and illustrates the difference between arms
as a good and arms as a right.
As mentioned in Part III, in Cuomo, the court determined that a New
York law restricting magazine capacity to seven rounds violated the Second
Amendment individual right.254 The court adhered to the narrow conception
of the individual right; it limited the individual right to protection of the
home.255 However, it diverged from the three-prong test and engaged in
intermediate scrutiny.256 Unsurprisingly, the court found that the regulations
as a whole would pass intermediate scrutiny because of the government’s
interests in “public safety and crime prevention.”257 However, the specific
portion of the regulation limiting the magazine capacity to seven rounds did
not pass intermediate scrutiny for lack of specific evidence.258 Yet, the court
implied that a hypothetical ten-round restriction would be constitutional.259
This distinction creates two problems. First, it sheds more light on the
manipulability of the levels of scrutiny. Second, it fails to clarify the scope
of the individual right and the difference between that right and the
nonconstitutional, preexisting right to own such an arm.

253. Id. at 642.
254. 804 F.3d 242, 264 (2d Cir. 2015); see Tom Precious, Appeals Court Upholds SAFE
Act but Rules Against Seven-Bullet Limit, BUFF. NEWS (Oct. 19, 2015), https://buffalonews.com/
2015/10/19/appeals-court-upholds-safe-act-but-rules-against-seven-bullet-limit [https://
perma.cc/33BD-BJJ7].
255. Cuomo, 804 F.3d at 258.
256. Id. at 260.
257. Id. at 261 (quoting Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir.
2012)). For a discussion of the role of the public safety concern in Second Amendment
regulation and jurisprudence, see generally Kevin Behne, Packing Heat: Judicial Review
of Concealed Carry Laws Under the Second Amendment, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1343 (2016).
258. Cuomo, 804 F.3d at 269. For a discussion of the problems associated with requiring
specific evidence in a Second Amendment case, particularly specific historical evidence,
see Allen Rostron, The Continuing Battle over the Second Amendment, 78 ALB. L. REV.
819, 820–21 (2014–2015).
259. Cuomo, 804 F.3d at 264.
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The court considered evidence of mass shootings and the role that large
capacity magazines play in those events,260 yet the court did not find that
limiting ten round magazines to a load of seven rounds presented “reasonable
inferences based on substantial evidence” of a governmental interest.261
The court believed evidence was not presented that the load limit would not
“convince” potential “malefactors” from loading more than seven rounds
into a ten round magazine.262 Intermediate scrutiny requires substantial
evidence.263 Thus, the court found that such a restriction would not pass
intermediate scrutiny.264 However, the court’s logic fails on two fundamental
fronts.
First, many laws do not convince potential malefactors from committing
the forbidden act. This becomes especially apparent when the law deals with
numerical limits. For example, the speed limit does not convince potential
speeders to not speed, but this does not imply that there should not be a
speed limit. A car may have the potential to go one-hundred miles per
hour, but setting the speed limit at seventy miles per hour will certainly
not ensure that the driver does not speed. Such a limit does, however, create
consequences that—if enforced consistently and intensely enough—will alter
the behavior of those drivers contemplating speeding. Of course, irrational
drivers would still speed no matter the consequence. Therefore, even though

260. See id. at 249. The court discusses the Sandy Hook shooting in Newton, Connecticut.
Id. In 2012, a gunman killed twenty school children and six teachers. German Lopez, In
the Year After Parkland, There Was Nearly One Mass Shooting a Day, VOX (Feb. 14,
2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/2/14/18223613/parkland-mass-shootingsgun-violence-map-charts-data [https://perma.cc/GH8B-2NHH]. In 2018, a shooter killed
seventeen people and injured seventeen others at Parkland High School in Parkland,
Florida. Id. Since then and as of February 14, 2019, there have been 350 mass shootings.
Id. And there have certainly been more since February 14, 2019, such as the Saugus High
School shooting. See German Lopez, Saugus High School Shooting in Santa Clarita, California:
What we Know, VOX (Nov. 15, 2019, 10:35 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/11/14/20964900/
saugus-high-school-santa-clarita-california-shooting [https://perma.cc/5DYD-5MNJ].
261. Cuomo, 804 F.3d at 264 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180,
195 (1997)).
262. Id.
263. Id. It is unclear how the court equates substantial evidence with evidence that
the law would convince potential wrongdoers. Substantial evidence in the context of intermediate
scrutiny does not usually have such force. See Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701
F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012) (“To survive intermediate scrutiny, the fit between the challenged
regulation need only be substantial, ‘not perfect.’” (quoting United States v. Marzzarella,
614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010))). The court here seems to ask for something closer to a
perfect fit.
264. Cuomo, 804 F.3d at 264.
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the seven round load limit may not stop malefactors from loading eight,
nine, or ten rounds, the law should not lose validity under that logic. The
court does acknowledge that a state should not be unable to enact a law because
of the “mere possibility of criminal disregard.”265 Yet, even though the court
concedes this point, it still demands evidence of the connection between
a load limit and increased safety to meet the requirements of intermediate
scrutiny.266 What evidence could be adduced? That criminals listen to
laws? The court seems to contradict itself. Although it proposes that laws
can be enacted in the face of “mere [] criminal disregard,”267 it demands
evidence that the law at issue will convince criminals to abandon that disregard.
This is impossible and points to an inherent flaw in the application of levels
of scrutiny to Second Amendment issues.
Second, a different story can easily make this restriction constitutional.
A court might think that the government surely has an interest in ensuring
that the fewest number of people are shot in a mass shooting. Although
the seven round load limit might not persuade every potential mass shooter
to use only seven rounds, it does not infringe on the individual right in such a
way so as to deem it unconstitutional. Even without evidence, it takes no
strained inference to conclude that limiting the amount of rounds in a gun
will help promote a safer environment—in theory, at least. Yet, even
this approach lacks clarity because it too can be manipulated to reflect the
actual decision of the court.
Applying the three-prong test yields a much clearer result. A seven round
load limit would not materially impede one’s ability to protect the home.
Because of this limited infringement on the individual right, the court should
have determined that a seven round load limit when balanced against the
benefits of such a limit—increased safety—is constitutional. One could
argue that the balancing test can yield the opposite result—much like the
levels of scrutiny. However, such an argument would not consider that under
the three-prong test, the court construes the individual right narrowly.
Therefore, the balance could not shift in favor of striking down a regulation
unless, like in Heller,268 the regulation placed a burden on the individual
right that did not outweigh the benefit. Here, one can still protect the home
with seven rounds nearly as well as with ten.269
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–75 (2008).
269. A regulation limiting the load limit to one or two rounds may yield a different
result because of a potential increased restriction on the individual right. This analysis does
expose a potential shortcoming of construing the right as that which is necessary to defend
the home. One could argue that necessary means different things for different homeowners.
However, if an individual claims that ten rounds is necessary because of the neighborhood
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The final case, also a Second Circuit case, New York State Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n v. City of New York, unknowingly applied the three-prong test in full.270
It illustrates how the test creates clear results and how it can be easily
applied. As mentioned in Part III, the court determined that a regulation
forbidding transferring a handgun from one home to another did not infringe
on the individual right.271 The court found that the regulation promoted
public safety and so would pass intermediate scrutiny nonetheless.272 The
intermediate scrutiny analysis is not intermediate scrutiny at all but a balancing
test, wherein the court balanced the limited infringement on the right against
the benefit of public safety.273
After determining that the regulation did not infringe the narrow individual
right, the court engaged in a Commerce Clause analysis and found that the
regulation did not violate the Commerce Clause.274 This endeavor delineated
the extent of the constitutional right to own an arm, but it did not limit the
nonconstitutional, legal ability to own arms outside of the constitutional
right.
Unlike Cuomo, City of New York adheres to a narrow construction of
the individual right and does not get bogged down in the convolutions of
levels of scrutiny.275 Even though the court purports to engage in an intermediate
scrutiny analysis, it really only performs a balancing test. Because of this,
the case is clearer; it would be even clearer if the court acknowledged that
it was, in fact, using a balancing test and not the traditional levels of scrutiny.

or size of the house in which the individual lives, the court would have to conclude that
the police force or other safety measures are less effective in some areas and some situations
than they are in others. Although this is certainly true, the answer to ineffective policing
should not be to militarize the public.
There is still the question of how many rounds would be too few. Although courts may
disagree about this number, it is far better for the courts to disagree about how many rounds
constitute what is necessary to defend the home rather than to disagree about the general
scope of the individual right.
270. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45, 55–66 (2d
Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019).
271. Id. at 57.
272. Id. at 64.
273. Id. at 62–64; see Ellis, supra note 57, at 1349.
274. City of New York, 883 F.3d at 64–66.
275. See Wright, supra note 62, at 184.
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D. Conclusion: The Three-Prong Test Trumps
Traditional Levels of Scrutiny
Overall, these cases demonstrate two key points. First, constitutional
levels of scrutiny are not easily or effectively applied to Second Amendment
issues. Because the rule of law requires the courts to express their interpretive
techniques as clearly as possible,276 purporting to analyze Second Amendment
issues under the guise of levels of scrutiny does not meet this duty. Second,
the three-prong test allows for a clearer decision and a more nuanced
understanding of the difference between the constitutional right to own an
arm and the nonconstitutional, legal right to own an arm as a good.
V. OTHER PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE HELLER AMBIGUITIES:
PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS
This Part will briefly engage with three other proposed solutions to the
Heller ambiguities.277 Each alternative solution has its merits, but, ultimately,
each approach has flaws that detract from its overall effectiveness.
A. The History and Tradition Test
First, Sam Zuidema278 proposes an analysis “rooted in text, history, and
tradition.”279 He proposes a two-prong test to deal with categorical bans
like that at issue in Heller.280 Prong one requires the court to ask whether
the firearms “have traditionally been banned,” and prong two asks whether
or not those firearms are in “common use by citizens for lawful purposes.”281
Although Zuidema’s solution avoids the usual levels of scrutiny, its focus
on tradition and common use unleashes a host of problems. The focus on
tradition creates problems because it fails to consider a situation where an
arm at issue has no basis in tradition.282 Although the problem of tradition
276. See supra notes 202–209.
277. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008).
278. When he wrote his Note, Mr. Zuidema was a J.D. Candidate 2018 at the University
of Illinois College of Law. Zuidema, supra note 5, at 813. Interestingly, most scholarship dealing
with the Heller ambiguities has been written by law students.
279. Id. at 840.
280. See id.
281. Id.
282. Consider how a court would deal with a regulation limiting the use of an AR15 or a variant of such a rifle in the mid-1950s—the introduction of the AR-15. Myre,
supra note 174. The court would not know if this gun had been traditionally banned because
the gun had yet to develop a tradition.
Also, the problem of relying on history and tradition is particularly problematic when
there is no indication of which side of the argument history supports. See Rostron, supra
note 258, at 838 (“In short, when the historical record does not really contain any specific
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can be averted by a comparison of similar arms, it is not unusual for an
arm to be materially unlike any previous arm.283 Even so, the real issue
of this approach lies in the reliance on what is and what is not in “common
use by citizens for lawful purposes.”284 A discussion of the flaws of this
approach appears in Part III. Therefore, Zuidema’s approach smartly avoids
the muddled levels of traditional constitutional scrutiny but fails to clarify
how a court should approach regulations that deal with either new arms or
arms that are in common use but that should not be afforded the protection
of a right.
B. The “Wait for the Supreme Court” Solution
Second, Andrew Kimball285 proposes adhering to an intermediate scrutiny
standard until the Supreme Court determines otherwise.286 Kimball proposes
intermediate scrutiny because arms rights are ill-defined.287 Although arms
rights may currently be ill-defined, and Kimball is right to assert that strict
scrutiny would be inappropriate for such a vague right,288 the cases discussed
in Part IV demonstrate that intermediate scrutiny does not work well with
a vague understanding of the individual right, either.289 Therefore, as mentioned
at the end of Part III, a successful argument for a revised approach to
Second Amendment individual right cases must define the right that it
analyzes. As explained in Part III, a narrow conception of the right is both
practical and consistent with Heller. Kimball’s assertion that arms rights
are vague is true only if no effort is made to define that right. Further, Kimball’s
proposition that lower courts should wait for a decision from the Supreme
Court290 is helpful only in theory. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the
Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify Heller’s ambiguities but omitted,
evidence one way or the other about the existence of a particular right, that lack of historical
evidence can too easily be twisted into supporting any side of an issue.”).
283. Compare a rifle that fires one shot with an automatic rifle that can fire many shots
in a short period of time. An analysis of the latter should not be informed by the tradition
of the former.
284. See Zuidema, supra note 5, at 840.
285. When he wrote his Note, Mr. Kimball was a J.D. Candidate, 2018 at Brooklyn
Law School. Andrew Kimball, Note, Strictly Speaking: Courts Should Not Adopt Strict
Scrutiny for Firearm Regulations, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 441, 475 (2017).
286. Id. at 474–75.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See cases discussed supra Part IV.
290. See Kimball, supra note 285, at 475.
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or decided not, to do so.291 The recent addition of progun Justice Brett
Kavanaugh292 to the Court throws more uncertainty onto the effectiveness
of Kimball’s proposition. Kavanaugh favors Heller’s history, text, and tradition
test, much like Zuidema does.293 Thus, it would be unwise to believe that
the current Supreme Court would attempt to modify any of Heller’s ambiguities
in a way consistent with the narrow right. Therefore, Kimball’s insistence
on waiting on the Supreme Court could leave the legal community waiting
in perpetuity or waiting for a ruling that creates more, rather than less,
confusion.
C. Sliding Levels of Scrutiny Dependent on Level of Infringement
Third, Aryn Sedore proposes that courts adhere to intermediate or strict
scrutiny depending on the level of infringement on the right.294 Sedore’s
approach focuses on whether or not the government can produce hard evidence,
and not mere speculation, that the law at issue will serve the regulation’s
interest.295 The emphasis on evidence solves, in some part, the flaws of
the intermediate and strict scrutiny distinction. Courts have declared that
a governmental interest in public safety would pass either intermediate or
strict scrutiny.296 Sedore points to the case Kolbe v. Hogan, which held
unconstitutional a ban on semiautomatic weapons in the home despite evidence
that mass shooters use those arms.297 She asserts that such evidence does
not indicate how removing those arms from the hands of law-abiding citizens
will increase public safety.298 This argument has its flaws. First, the government
can enact laws aimed at making it more difficult for a criminal to commit
a crime.299 Second, and most importantly, the reasoning Sedore employs

291. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 746 (2010).
292. German Lopez, Brett Kavanaugh’s 2nd Amendment Views, Explained, VOX
(Sept. 5, 2018, 2:22 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/9/5/17820310/brett-kavanaughsecond-amendment-guns-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/Y4LN-JZP5].
293. Id.; see also Rostron, supra note 258, at 838.
294. Sedore, supra note 140, at 93.
295. Id.
296. See, e.g., United States v. Colon-Quiles, 859 F. Supp. 2d 229, 233 (D.P.R. 2012).
297. See Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 148–49 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Sedore,
supra note 140, at 93.
298. See Sedore, supra note 140, at 93.
299. See, e.g., Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 827 (9th Cir. 2016). The Court
explained that a ten-day restriction was okay. Id. A ten-day restriction is unnecessary for
those lawfully acquiring a gun. It is interested only in those attempting to illegally acquire
a gun. One could argue that if an individual has no arms, then the right to defend the home
is violated, in theory, by having to wait ten days. However, a court would balance the safety
concerns protected by the ten-day waiting period against the infringement on the right.
The court in City of New York accepted the argument that safety is increased by keeping
guns out of the hands of individuals who could act brashly—when driving. See N.Y. State
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could invalidate any regulation because law-abiding citizens, as such, do
not contribute to a lack of general public safety. Imagine Sedore’s approach
under the facts of New York Pistol & Rifle Ass’n v. City of New York
mentioned in Parts III and IV. The court noted that the regulation at issue
—forbidding the transfer of a handgun from one home to the other—would
pass intermediate scrutiny.300 The court considered evidence that one driving
with a gun could become susceptible to road rage and could use the gun
to satisfy that rage.301 Yet, under Sedore’s approach, a law-abiding citizen
would not use a gun in any unlawful capacity. Thus, a limit on where a
law-abiding citizen could take a gun would not pass constitutional muster
because a law-abiding citizen would not break the law—fire the gun—no
matter where the citizen was. This conflicts, at least in part, with Heller’s
explicit mandate that schools and other protected areas remain no carry
zones.302 Therefore, for these two reasons, Sedore’s approach falls short.
However, it seems the most compelling of the approaches examined thus
far.
D. Conclusion: Each Approach Has its Flaws
Overall, these three approaches demonstrate not only the difficulty of
dealing with the Heller ambiguities but also the Second Amendment’s ripeness
for interpretation, analysis, and debate. Although each proposes intriguing
solutions, flaws detract from the general effectiveness of each. In the end,
the three-prong test seems better suited to deal with the Second Amendment’s
complexities.
VI. THE “THREE-PRONG” SOLUTION
This Comment proposes a three-prong solution. Prong one asks whether
or not a regulation infringes on a narrow reading of the individual right.
If the right is infringed, prong two asks whether or not the benefit of the
regulation outweighs the burden on the right. If the right is not infringed,

Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45, 63 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted,
139 S. Ct. 939 (2019). But see Brian Burns, Note, Holding Fire: Why Long Waiting Periods to
Buy a Gun Violate the Second Amendment, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 379, 381 (2013) (concluding
that any waiting period longer than twenty-four hours is unconstitutional).
300. City of New York, 883 F.3d at 57.
301. Id. at 63.
302. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
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prong three asks the court to determine if the regulation violates the Commerce
Clause or Dormant Commerce Clause.
Prong one is of the utmost importance. It is also the prong that will receive
the most pushback. At first glance, prong one seems to limit the individual
right in a nearly debilitating manner. One may argue that the narrow right
protects only the right to bear a handgun in the home for purposes of selfdefense. And in part, this argument is right; prong one does ask the court
to limit an interpretation of the Heller individual right. But although the
constitutional right may be so limited, it does not imply that there does not
exist a nonconstitutional right to bear other arms. This difference should
help those supporters of an expanded individual right come to terms with
the narrow conception advanced here.
The narrow right, as explained in the Sections above, includes one’s right
to defend the home but does not include defending one’s home by any means.
It is limited to those means necessary to defend the home. This distinction
will create some concern. What is and is not necessary to defend the home?
In some cases, defense of the home may require more than Heller’s handgun.
In some cases, less than Heller’s handgun may be necessary. But this
detracts from the key point of the narrow reading. It is not about limiting
the right but about thinking about the right with the proper mindset. This
mindset requires an understanding of the difference between an arm as a
right and an arm as a good. With this mindset, limiting the right becomes
a matter of legal interpretation as opposed to political interpretation. One
could own a gun like an AR-15 that is not necessary to the defense of the
home via one’s nonconstitutional right to own an AR-15 as a good.
The prong two balancing test requires little explanation. If the benefit
outweighs the burden, the regulation will survive. Although this may reflect
the traditional levels of scrutiny in some respects, it is at least clearer. It
reflects the actual interpretive techniques used by the courts. It is also an
approach that clarifies the inherent ambiguity in applying traditional levels
of scrutiny, which protect abstract concepts like free speech, to a concrete
good, like a handgun. As a result, the public will have a better understanding
of the courts’ interpretive methods and, thus, a better understanding of the
Second Amendment individual right.
In prong three, the court will ask if the regulation would violate the
Commerce Clause. These regulations will often deal with the production
or distribution of arms protected by the individual right or with arms unnecessary
to the defense of the home. The purpose of the last prong is to help differentiate
between the arms that one has a right to own and the arms that one has the
nonconstitutional legal ability to own—hunting rifles and the like. This
distinction bears on the inherent regulatory difference between a right to
an abstract concept, like free speech, and a right to a concrete good.
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Hopefully, over time, the third prong will separate from the first two prongs.
Ideally, the public will begin to understand the scope of the Second Amendment
individual right so as to bring a Second Amendment claim only when a regulation
infringes on when, where, and how one can use an arm necessary to the
defense of the home. In some ways, this will reflect the public’s enhanced
understanding of the difference between arms as goods and arms as a right.
Ultimately, it is this distinction that can bridge the political chasm between
those equally fervent for and against arms.
A. Conclusion
To conclude, this solution’s overarching goal is to find a medium between
arms ownership and arms rights. It does not propose that the Second Amendment
protects all arms, but it also does not propose making all arms nearly impossible
to obtain like they are in the United Kingdom—at least according to David
Sedaris.303 It proposes that the law reflect the interpretive techniques of
the courts and that the courts refrain from making the law overly complex
for the sake of complexity. In the end, the Second Amendment individual
right requires simplification and clarification if there is any hope of moving
beyond the arms problems that currently plague the United States.

303.

Sedaris, supra note 1, at 34.
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